



# Staking Their Claims: Land Disputes In Southern Mozambique

by

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**ABSTRACT:** Conflicting interests in land and resource use emerged in postwar Mozambique, giving rise to multiple layers of dispute. This article explores the disputes occurring between 1992 and 1995 in two districts which are notable for the severity of competition over land by virtue of their proximity to Maputo, namely, Matutuíne and Namaacha. Although private sector claims were beginning to be staked with the potential for displacing people occupying the same land, other conflicts still predominated. Some accompanied the contradictory, complex, and unstable peacetime population movements—people were dispersing into areas abandoned during the war, leaving overcrowded government wartime accommodation centers, and returning from neighboring countries. But, at the same time, insecurity and competition over land contributed to a new process of settlement concentration. In the context of severe drought, high unemployment, and contracting opportunity in South Africa, unemployed labor migrants, urban youth, and demobilized soldiers were attracted to the burgeoning and largely unregulated trades of charcoal-burning, fishing, hunting, and palm-wine tapping. These immigrants came into conflict with returning locals in bitter clashes which often focused primarily on trees, fish, and game rather than on land per se. Attempts to regulate resource exploitation were constrained by the inadequacy and corruptibility of fiscal controls, by armed groups, and by the crisis of authority at local level which characterized both government- and Renamo-administered areas.

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## Introduction

The process of postwar reconstruction which followed the signing of Mozambique's General Peace Accord in 1992 saw a proliferation of disputes over land and resources operating on different levels. Gregory Myers and the Land Tenure Center (LTC) project in Mozambique have explored the set of conflicts associated with the government practice of land redistribution to the private sector, including the insecurity and conflict generated by a poorly functioning land-titling procedure and the lack of a central institution for adjudicating overlapping claims.<sup>(3)</sup> Private-sector land allocations have the potential to provoke conflicts with "family sector"<sup>(4)</sup> farmers as well as with such resource users as charcoal burners, fishermen, and hunters. Such disputes will probably escalate over the next few years as claims are physically demarcated, investments are made in fencing and infrastructure, and land is cleared for production. But in the three years between 1992 and 1995, only a tiny fraction of the small-, medium-, and large-scale private farms were producing anything commercially and many of the family-sector farmers living within private leaseholdings had not been told to leave.

Actual patterns of resource exploitation within the family sector provoked another set of disputes. Such conflicts were numerous, widespread, and unrelated to the formal, centralized process of allocating land. They centered not on the land in itself, but on the control and use of valuable resources—trees, game, and fish—the importance of which was heightened in the

severe drought of the postwar period.

This article explores the particular intensity of these different types of dispute in Matutuíne and Namaacha districts of Maputo Province.<sup>(5)</sup> Being close to the capital and abutting the South Africa and Swaziland borders, these districts have historically been a focus for state and private agricultural investment and have witnessed severe competition over land. They also have a history of population movement, being traversed by some of the oldest and most well-trodden labor migration routes into South Africa. The work force for past developments was drawn predominantly from Inhambane and Gaza provinces (both during the colonial period and after independence in 1975), because the local population preferred to look to the better-remunerated South African labor market, had strong cross-border ties, and often possessed citizenship in South Africa or Swaziland as well as in Mozambique.

The proximity of Maputo and South Africa became important in new ways after the war as groups of unemployed, including demobilized soldiers, moved out of the city and tried to make a living by charcoal cutting, fishing, hunting, and palm-wine tapping for the Maputo market. Since charcoal burning, hunting, and fishing had often been dominated by nonlocals during the war and depended on agreements negotiated with the military, recruitment in the postwar period was often Maputo based and built upon army contacts. The exploitation of these valuable resources by groups of former soldiers and wartime displaced persons provoked a multitude of severe disputes with returning locals who had historical claims to the land. A discourse of locals versus outsiders, which was an important aspect of local politics in the past, took on new significance in the postwar period.

The first half of this article provides an overview of private-sector land applications and their implications for the family sector as well as for national and international conservationist interests in the region. The second section details conflicts generated by the flourishing charcoal, hunting, and fishing trades, discussing the role of the drought and wartime legacies in the patterns of exploitation. Since fiscal and other government attempts to control resource extraction were almost entirely ineffective, the paper focuses on local attempts to regulate access to resources.

## Land distribution to the private sector

The market orientation that characterizes Mozambique's agricultural policy and the process of state divestiture dates from the fourth Frelimo Congress in 1983; market bias was further entrenched with the structural adjustment program after 1987 and has been retained since then. Although this shift away from an unproductive state sector promised to reinvigorate agricultural production and provide a window of opportunity for "family sector" producers who lacked support at independence (Hermele 1988, p. 54), it has dispossessed and impoverished smallholders (Myers 1994, p. 603).

The pattern and intensity of land applications in Matutuíne and Namaacha districts in March 1995 had much in common with other areas that had experienced considerable private and state investment. Between 1991 and early 1995, the greater part of high-quality agricultural land in Matutuíne and Namaacha districts was surveyed for private sector applicants. If all land requests that appeared in the official provincial-level register in early 1995 are actually granted, much more land will be allocated than was ever used by the state farm, cooperative, and private sectors after independence. The map presented below illustrates the pattern of land applications from the official provincial register in March 1995, showing them to be concentrated in the Maputo River valley, in prime cattle country in the Lubombo foothills, and in the coastal area attractive to tourists. Although there are marked continuities in patterns of investment from the colonial period through independence and into the postwar period,<sup>(6)</sup> postwar tourism and forestry development also encroach on land in the coastal hinterland which had not previously received private or state investment and which indeed had previously had protected-area status. Since March 1995, many of the applications detailed below have been incorporated within, and may be supplanted by, a 250,000-hectare ecotourist application made by Texas billionaire James Blanchard III in the district of Matutuíne.

### Land Applications: Matutuíne and Namaacha Districts

*Map from Provincial Cadastral Service (DINAGECA, Maputo), April 1995, showing pattern of applications for land.*

*(Illustration available only in published paper)*

The rights of smallholders within private sector allocations is unclear. Taking the example of the three largest concession applications in March 1995, the following paragraphs describe the effects of the land-leasing process on smallholders and the varying roles played by government and other institutions in trying, or not trying, to take their part. In most cases, the future of the affected family-sector farmers is still under discussion.

1. After the war's end in 1992, the João Ferreira dos Santos (JFS) company renewed a 10,000-hectare land concession held since 1983 in Changalane, Namaacha District (though production had ceased after 1984, when war came to the area). The concession land consisted of the former state farm, the Sociedade Pecuária de Maziminhama, which itself had replaced the privately owned Mourgada estate.<sup>(7)</sup> The relatively small population of 672 which lived on this farm at the end of the war comprised nonlocal charcoal burners, including demobilized soldiers.<sup>(8)</sup> They were simply evicted in 1994 to a village site in the waterless, rocky hillsides rising behind and overlooking the farm. After the eviction returnees with historical claims to land in and adjacent to the concession continued to trickle back from neighboring countries; they joined the evictees outside the concession boundary or decided to live elsewhere, mostly in South Africa or Swaziland. Some returnees and immigrants tried to settle in the workers' village despite not being employees of the estate.<sup>(9)</sup>
2. After the war, Lomaco renewed a 22,000-hectare joint venture with the government in Changalane, Namaacha District. Initiated in 1983, this replaced the former state farm, the Empresa Agro-Pecuária de Changalane, itself occupying the site of the old Cardiga estate, though production was paralyzed by the war.<sup>(10)</sup> According to maps held in the provincial cadastral service, the boundaries of the postwar concession incorporated 13 smaller private-sector farms occupying an estimated 5–10 percent of the land area. These small-scale titleholders were to be re-registered and allowed to stay. <sup>(11)</sup> The population of at least 11,000 (including locals, former farm workers, displaced persons, immigrant charcoal burners, and demobilized soldiers) who were living without land title inside the concession were to be allowed to reside in villages that were created and expanded during the war, making use of agricultural plots in the demarcated blocks that were under negotiation. <sup>(12)</sup> In March 1995, local authorities were contesting inadequate land allocations, such as the 30 hectares of dry land set aside by Lomaco for the population of 4,140 living in Changalane.<sup>(13)</sup> In the case of the communal village of Mayelane, the provincial governor intervened to secure access to irrigated land for the 556 families which were allocated 600 hectares of dry land more suited to grazing. <sup>(14)</sup> People still outside the country who had historical claims to land were to be dispossessed. Land for descendants of the 1995 population was not included in negotiations with Lomaco, though for this purpose local authorities and the Ministry of Agriculture discussed setting aside "reserved" land outside the concession in the (dry and rocky) Lubombo foothills.<sup>(15)</sup> Although scarcity of grazing land was not a contemporary problem, it will be in the future if people in the family sector succeed in restocking to prewar levels of several thousand head.<sup>(16)</sup>
3. Mosaflorestal is a 32,000-hectare joint venture between the South African Pulp and Paper Industry (Sappi), two Mozambican companies (Socimo and Socief), and the government in Matutuíne District abutting the Natal border.<sup>(17)</sup> Unlike the other two concessions, this lease occupied land that had not been the focus of private and state investment in previous eras.<sup>(18)</sup> The concession was negotiated at central-government level during the war, overlapping nine smaller applications made at provincial level for an estimated 20 percent of the land area of the concession.<sup>(19)</sup> It also occupies part of the land in Blanchard's proposed 250,000-hectare tourist venture; the final decision on the much-reported conflict between these two interests is still pending.<sup>(20)</sup> According to Sappi, the 3,000 people scattered within the concession would be allowed to live and cultivate where they are living, while company laborers would live in planned and concentrated villages. However, the main existing sources of livelihood (fishing, palm-wine tapping, and agriculture) may be threatened by the effects of the proposed eucalyptus monoculture on the water table and ecology.<sup>(21)</sup> Sappi argues that employment would be attractive to locals because housing would be provided and proposed weekly salaries would compare favorably with Mozambican rates as well as with wages paid to (illegal) Mozambican labor on the farms of the Eastern Transvaal. No provision has been made for descendants nor for the sizable number of people who have not returned from South Africa.<sup>(22)</sup> Many living within the concession do not have historical claims, being former migrant laborers and soldiers from elsewhere in the country and people invited back by Renamo.<sup>(23)</sup>

In short, the family sector farmers living inside these three large concessions will face diverse futures: as evictees on poor-quality land adjacent to the concession; as residents in planned, concentrated settlements using allocated plots of (irrigable) land; and, finally, as residents within a concession where livelihoods other than farm labor are likely to be undermined.

The medium-sized private sector applications were also likely to have diverse and adverse effects for family sector farmers

with conflicting claims. Farms in this category that were actually occupied in 1995 belonged to returning farmers who had used the same leases before the war, and to new South African applicants, usually in partnership with Mozambicans. Returning colonial era landholders and other first-time applicants were slower to occupy land; their applications were held up and overlapped with other claims. Some applicants may not have been serious about investing. Applications for "ecotourist ventures" along the coast are overwhelmingly from South Africans; the coastline from Inhaca Island to Natal was an uninterrupted patchwork of leases up to 4,500 hectares in size, which are now incorporated within the overlapping Blanchard application.(24) Such projects sometimes foresaw a future for the local population as laborers and guides and as members of "traditional" villages, but, in general, the possibility and terms of such continued residence were unclear and insecure (Hatton et al. 1995, pp. 16, 34).(25) The attitude of new South African landholders was in some cases unnecessarily offensive. One such farmer, a cattle rancher in Moamba, fenced not alongside the road but directly across it. If administration officials wanted to visit the community of family sector farmers, Frelimo secretary, or former chief enclosed within the concession, or if they wanted to use the road, they first had to contact the South African for a key to the gate that blocked access.(26) Negotiations by district authorities for land for the population of about 500 living inside this concession focused not on the whole land area but on a small area of riverine wetland which made up a tiny fraction of the farm.(27)

Other private-sector applications were concentrated in the Maputo River valley, occupying prime riverine land which had been developed in the 1960s. Commercial development of this land, however, had not recommenced by 1995: dikes, pumps, and roads were in disrepair; marketing and other infrastructure was nonexistent; plots close to former government military positions were still mined.(28) Production took the form of small family-sector riverine gardens often within private leases.

Similarly, the overwhelming majority of medium-scale private-sector cattle-ranching applications had not been translated into actual enterprises, and prewar cattle populations of 102,000 had been reduced to an estimated 1,000 head in private and family sectors combined. (29) The handful of operating ranches was undermined by armed cattle-thieving gangs against whom investment in fencing, armed cattle herders, and kraal guards were a necessary but sometimes inadequate defense.(30) Family-sector cattle owners also faced armed theft. In one communal village, the village president successfully obtained a license for firearms to guard the village's collectively kraaled herd.(31) But individual family-sector cattle owners were refused firearm licenses.(32) Some preferred to keep their stock with relatives outside the country while others delayed repatriating. (33)

Historically, family sector access to pasture was often based on informal arrangements or encroachments on underused state and private land. At Nkulula, for example, family sector farmers adjacent to a medium-scale cattle ranch had an informal joint-herding agreement with the prewar rancher through which they got access to good pasture and watering points. A dispute arose with the postwar lessee who was not interested in a comparable arrangement.(34) A further danger is that family-sector cattle owners will be excluded from pastureland parceled out before they have managed to restock.

On paper, the March 1995 pattern of private sector applications had much in common with the pattern of concessions characterizing the late colonial-era land rush in districts close to the capital.(35) Maputo Province in the 1960s saw a flurry of enormous and often underutilized concessions, speculative land purchases, and "weekend" farming.(36) An inspector's report singled out the huge 22,000-hectare Cardiga estate (later to become the Lomaco estate, detailed above) as the epitome of excessive landholding (Mozambique 1960). On the eve of independence, chiefs voicing populist concerns at meetings with administrators complained not only of alienation of their land but also of loss of access to water sources, lagoons, wetlands, and pasture, even of the right of passage across the new estates.(37) Cardiga's investment in a new system of canalized water from the Umbeluzi River, for example, left the local population with an inadequate supply (AHM 1962). Some settlements were completely depopulated because water was diverted to other estates.(38) Some groups crossed the border into Swaziland;(39) others tried to demand native reserves.(40) In Changanlane, the inspector of administrative services urgently requested a survey to find out if there was any land left in the *posto* which was not under private title, since the huge fenced blocks ("veritable countries") were more or less continuous. After independence, despite popular pressure for land redistribution, there were constraints on peasants' access to alienated land, for much abandoned private property, including the Cardiga estate, was incorporated into state farms. Occupation of the remaining land was conditioned on it being exploited collectively; restitution of former lands in principle was outlawed (De Brito 1991, p. 179).

The 1960s also saw the development of the Maputo River *colonato* as a Portuguese settler scheme. The state made minimal provisions for an elite of African smallholders to occupy riverine land, reserving twelve of the 200-hectare plots for subdivision for African smallholders and a 50-hectare plot for the chief (Junta Provincial 1961–1969). But many others were displaced onto dry land or land which flooded unmanageably.(41) After independence, state farms came to take only a small part of former *colonato* land. Some prime land was occupied by peasants in cooperatives, though their lack of capital and the

sabotage and disrepair of dikes and pumping systems proved to be critical constraints. Although in theory outlawed, individuals also reoccupied their former lands, but they rarely cultivated more than small gardens.<sup>(42)</sup> Redistribution in this way resulted from the state's inability to apply its own priorities, which privileged the state sector rather than fulfill plans to meet populist land claims.<sup>(43)</sup> Private-sector land applications, when they are actually developed, will alienate land which has not been commercially developed since before independence. Since policymakers have assumed that private sector farmers are more capable than the family sector (Myers 1994, p. 603), there are no restrictions preventing private reoccupation of all prime land in the Maputo valley. <sup>(44)</sup>

## The Role of local authorities

Local authorities in the two districts played contrasting roles in the ongoing process of land distribution. In Namaacha, the district agricultural authorities set up an Ad Hoc Land Commission which included representatives of the administrative tiers below district level (such as Chagalane-post and locality-level officials) and chiefs. The Commission aimed to secure access to land for the family sector; it negotiated and tried to contest minimal land allocations by the concessionaires. Although set up in 1993, after much land had already been allocated, this was a positive attempt to involve the population in decisions affecting the future. No comparable initiative existed in Matutuíne, where the Mosaflorestal concession was supported by district officials on the grounds that it would bring jobs and investment important in the process of reconstruction.<sup>(45)</sup>

Unlike other parts of the country, Renamo did not allocate concessions in the areas it controlled in Matutuíne. No applicants approached the Renamo administration, which was circumvented in the whole process of allocating land.<sup>(46)</sup> This partly reflects the weakness of Renamo in the south and its contested occupation of the territory it came to administer after the 1992 Peace Accord. The provincial government and district authorities argued that Renamo did not legitimately administer any part of Matutuíne District, having occupied the administrative posts of Zitundo and Tinonganine only after the Peace Accord.<sup>(47)</sup> However, there had been no government personnel stationed at these posts since they were abandoned in the war. Other zones of Renamo influence were pockets within government-held posts. In Matutuíne, Renamo tried to use the land issue in ongoing district-level debates over territorial and administrative integration, arguing that the hand-over of Renamo zones to government should be contingent on government's securing the livelihood and land rights of the population in the area. <sup>(48)</sup>

The Renamo administrator and political representatives at Zitundo post in Matutuíne District initially opposed the Sappi and other concessions, such as the South African "ecotourist" ventures.<sup>(49)</sup> They claimed that in opposing government land policy, they were reflecting popular opinion. According to the Renamo administrator in Zitundo in 1995:<sup>(50)</sup>

We are on an island here, an island in a sea of South African concessions. How can the government sell off land which we have liberated without consulting us? Who will look after the people's interest when we have gone? The government's interest is in their own pockets, not in the people's interest.

The Renamo administration in Zitundo tried to contest government concession-giving by organizing meetings with chiefs to rally popular protest against private sector leases. They argued that the government had granted land concessions in areas of Renamo control for political reasons—and without reference to local views—to undermine Renamo influence and punish the local electorate for supporting an opposition party.<sup>(51)</sup> In fact, evidence from the provincial register did not support the view that land concessions were more numerous in areas of Renamo influence; although Renamo-administered Zitundo post felt like an island in a sea of concessions to the officials stationed there, so too did the government-controlled administrative post of Chagalane. Renamo's opposition to the Mosaflorestal forestry concession was not long-lived, however; by 1996, they were vocal in their support of the Mosaflorestal project and the jobs and investment it would bring and opposed the competing Blanchard ecotourist application favored by the president.<sup>(52)</sup>

In both government-administered areas and those where Renamo had influence, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were authorized to rebuild schools within private-sector land concessions. The government reconstruction plan for Matutuíne District, for example, included rebuilding not only schools but also health posts and villages, some of which were within land claimed by medium-scale concessionaires as well as under the Blanchard application.<sup>(53)</sup> Renamo authorized NGOs working in the areas of its influence to rebuild schools within concessions allocated by the government (for example, at Ponta Malongane, within an application for an ecotourist venture, and at Hindane, within an application for a cattle ranch). The existence of the schools underlined the local communities' claims to land and residence and may enhance their future negotiating position. Private land applicants tried to oppose school construction for this reason; in one case, the applicant tried to persuade district authorities to allow a recently completed school to be converted into a store room.<sup>(54)</sup> Reconstruction of schools had an influence beyond that of merely providing education, that is, shaping competition over land and hence the

emerging postwar land-use patterns.

Other NGO projects were also important in creating opportunities and a sense (if not always a reality) of security for family-sector farmers. A small number of farmers secured land access via government and NGO projects to register title for peasant associations and cooperatives. There was also a pilot program to register individual titles.<sup>(55)</sup> The perception that there was more security in the bigger villages was enhanced when NGOs invested in the development of agriculture, irrigation, marketing, or schools. Such villages commonly attracted population beyond their capacity. For example, the communal village of Mafuiane in Namaacha was initiated before the war,<sup>(56)</sup> when, after the *pequenos libombos* dam was completed in 1987, the Italians invested in planning and later supplying irrigation water for smallholders in the village.<sup>(57)</sup> After the war, Mafuiane came not only to host people originally from the area but also to attract other immigrants, including some demobilized soldiers. The scale of immigration exceeded the space available for homes and irrigated agriculture. Latecomers and former refugees, who did not have historical claims to land in the area, formed their own settlement on the outskirts of village land. They had inadequate domestic water (delivered in barrels), lacked access to irrigated plots, and during the drought could not cultivate on the dry land. Some left after a year, going to Swaziland and South Africa.<sup>(58)</sup>

Mafuiane was not an atypical case. Although the size of some villages gave them the appearance of security, many did not have land formally allocated to them and were therefore involved in a host of disputes with the private sector. At Impaputo, for example, village authorities allocated land belonging to a private farmer to latecomer returnees from Swaziland (most of whom did not have historical land claims in the area).<sup>(59)</sup> In general, village residents who occupied old farm buildings and cultivated former private or state farmland were vulnerable to eviction.

In the insecurity of the postwar period, a combination of factors contributed to a renewed process of settlement concentration. Some nucleated settlements were formalized in the process of negotiation between concessionaires and local authorities, defined numbers of families being allocated plots in demarcated residential and agricultural areas. Some NGOs chose to promote planned settlements as a basis for integrated development programs. The cost of relative security against eviction in these cases was residence in a settlement not unlike one of the former communal villages.<sup>(60)</sup> The perception that not only land access but also livelihood more generally would be more secure in such villages led some people to opt for concentrated settlements, whereas in other circumstances they might have preferred to disperse. By increasing dependence on handouts and exacerbating problems of rural water supply, the drought enhanced the constraints on population dispersal. The new process of settlement concentration was one of the products of the insecurity of the postwar period to which concession-giving contributed. If it persists, it will be an ironic sequel to a war in which government unpopularity was fueled by the creation of concentrated settlement in the form of communal villages. It remains to be seen whether the new concentrated settlements are stable or transient, a product of the few opportunities which existed in the postwar economy. The process of population dispersal is explored at greater length below.

## Conservation interests

Some government departments had an interest in controlling the speed and pattern of land concessions to the private sector, though not in the first instance to assure land access for the "family sector." The Department of Forestry and Wildlife (DNFFB), as the institutional partner of the World Bank Global Environmental Facility Transfrontier Conservation Areas project, has a declared interest in a "freeze" on all land concessions in Matutuíne pending the development of a land-use plan. It is not clear how influential this will be, given DNFFB's "lack of high level political support"<sup>(61)</sup> and the existence of other government interests in concession-giving. The concern to freeze such applications is primarily conservationist. There are three protected areas in Matutuíne: the Maputo Special Reserve, a protected zone extending from the right bank of the Maputo River to the coast, and the Licuáti Forest (Quadros 1994; Hatton et al. 1995, p.10). The protected zone and the Licuáti Forest, like the Special Reserve, were established before independence. Since no legislation since independence has confirmed, modified, or revoked the status of partial and total protection zones, their legal status is "open to question" (EDG 1994, pp. 6, 89). The restrictions stemming from the protected status of the Licuáti Forest and the protected zone east of the Maputo River have never been invoked (Hatton et al. 1995, p. 10). Distribution of land to the private sector, as it appeared in provincial registers, encroaches on these protected areas and may conflict with the ambitious transfrontier conservation plans for Mozambique's border regions, which have been so attractive to international donors.

The idea of a transfrontier conservation area on the Mozambican side of the Kruger Park dates back to the 1930s (EDG 1994, p. 11). It was resurrected in 1990 by a South Africa/Mozambique working group which developed a highly ambitious plan that was never implemented (*ibid.*, p. 13). However, the discussions sparked much interest, and a separate initiative was presented to the World Bank Global Environmental Facility. Preparatory and other studies for this project are ongoing and

involve Swaziland and Zimbabwe as well as South Africa.

The transfrontier conservation area (TCA) envisaged for Maputo has several different elements.<sup>(62)</sup> The Futi elephant corridor (an area of approximately 90,000 hectares) is designed to link elephant populations in the Tembe and Ndumu parks in Natal with the relict 30 or 40 elephants in the Maputo Special Reserve. Initially intended to include the area between the Maputo and Futi rivers, this corridor has been shifted eastward to avoid competition from private-sector applications in the former *colonato*. It may involve moving people out of the Futi River valley onto productive land along the Maputo River not yet claimed by the private sector (Hatton et al. 1995). Given the problem of elephant damage to crops in the proposed conservation area and the antipathy to elephants this has created, electric fencing may be used to restrict elephants to the corridor. Other aspects of the program include improving the Maputo Special Reserve, producing a marine coastal development plan, and starting tourist activity in the Lubombo hills, which run the length of Mozambique's border with Swaziland. The coastal development plan overlaps with areas earmarked for the Mosaflorestal eucalyptus monoculture and private tourist ventures while the Lubombo developments may face competition from not only the private sector but also the proposed family-sector "reserve" mentioned above.

The inspiration for much current thinking in the TCA project has been community-based wildlife-management programs, such as the Campfire projects in Zimbabwe, which aim to include local communities as beneficiaries of the income from tourism and hunting. Although revenues have been substantial in Zimbabwean project areas, which are abundant in wildlife and where income derives from trophy hunting, particularly of elephant, the revenue accruing to individual families has often been insufficient to form an incentive for participation (Murombedzi 1991). In the Maputo Special Reserve, game populations are insignificant following their depletion during the war and it may take time to restock. It has also been argued that hunting tariffs and trophy fees in Mozambique need revision if there is to be substantial income from wildlife (EDG 1994, p. 41).

Aside from the current paucity of game and the existence of private-sector land claims within the proposed conservation areas, there are several further challenges to such projects in the Mozambican context. The projects require a legally constituted, bounded "community" to act as beneficiary of the tourism and hunting revenues. In Zimbabwean projects, this role is usually played by district authorities. Although this has often given rise to problems of distribution within the district,<sup>(63)</sup> the difficulties in southern Mozambique are of a different order. Much of the pre-war "community" had not returned from South Africa and Swaziland by 1995. Parts of the border, such as the environs of the former administrative post of Manhoca (within the proposed Futi corridor), were still mined and deserted. In 1995, many of the community residents within the former protected area east of the Maputo River were not "locals," did not have historical claims to land, and were involved in disputes with returnees. Some arrived during the war and stayed on; others were invited into the country by Renamo after the peace agreement; still others in-migrated to the area to hunt, fish, or exploit timber or palm wine.

There was also a crisis of authority at the local level. According to consultants working on the TCA project in Matutuúne in 1993, this amounted to "virtual anarchy" (EDG 1994). Whether or not the situation could be described as anarchic, the ongoing resource disputes were augmented before the elections by Frelimo and Renamo efforts to extend authority over the contested territory and returning people. Disputed areas sometimes had two or more people claiming to be responsible: a Frelimo secretary, a Renamo representative, a refugees' representative, and/or one or more representatives of "traditional" authorities.<sup>(64)</sup> Although in some places local leaders worked together, in others they were in conflict and could be played off against each other, undermining any attempt to control resource use. The war left a legacy of disrespect and distrust of all authority, which will constitute a major challenge for any community-based program.<sup>(65)</sup>

Both the pattern of concession-giving and the ambitious plans of conservation are critical for the area's future, but, in the interim, most important economic activities in the rural areas were associated with the (largely unregulated) exploitation of fish, game, charcoal, firewood, and palm wine. The following section, therefore, turns to disputes over the control and use of these resources.

## Trees, fish, and game

Although there were land-focused disputes between people returning home and those occupying the areas during the war, these conflicts were localized. They occurred particularly in border areas, in areas with much wartime immigration, and in wetlands. During the 1992–1995 postwar period, many more disputes focused on trees, game, and fish, for these resources not only made up the main sources of rural income under the drought but also were especially subject to competition from wartime displaced and immigrant populations moving into the rural areas specifically to exploit them. Since the postwar period coincided with a severe drought, it is difficult to separate the effects of the drought from the legacies of the war. The

drought heightened dependence on income derived from charcoal, firewood, palm wine, game, and fish in a region where agriculture was contingent on rainfall, where only a fraction of the wetlands was productive, and where sizable cattle herds were all but eliminated during the war.<sup>(66)</sup> The population displacements of the war and the exploitation of these resources by the military and former military enhanced competition in these trades. The following sections investigate postwar trends in the pattern of natural resource exploitation, discussing wartime legacies, the drought, and other influences.

## 1) Charcoal

The context for the expansion of charcoal trade during the war was the dramatic increase in demand for charcoal and firewood in Maputo, as the city swelled from the approximately 700,000 persons recorded in the census of 1980 to an estimated 1.5 million people in 1988.<sup>(67)</sup> The current population may be twice that size. At the same time, opportunities in the South African labor market diminished: contracts on the mines shrank in number after independence, and deportations from the farms of the Transvaal and Natal as well as from South African cities became increasingly regular in the late 1980s and early 1990s.<sup>(68)</sup> Young men who failed to get jobs in South Africa, or were thrown out of the country, often ended up among Maputo's unemployed. Others came to the capital after their demobilization from the army or fled to Maputo for safety.

Many of these immigrants, demobilized soldiers, and other displaced persons got to know the charcoal dealers and truck owners from Maputo, and then moved out of the city to government army outposts to join the charcoal burners. The soaring cost of living and the lack of other opportunities made charcoal burning an attractive economic activity. Social networks established through government military service were also an important means of recruitment, and some soldiers abandoned the war specifically to go and cut charcoal.<sup>(69)</sup> Changalane *sede* was one such charcoal burners' outpost. It was one of the first in Namaacha and was developed rapidly in the years following 1988. Most of Changalane's prewar population had fled Renamo's first attacks in 1984; they had not been villagized, living scattered around the periphery of the former private and state-owned cattle ranches (including the JFS and Lomaco concessions), and cutting charcoal on a small scale was one among many livelihood activities. During the war, a government military presence was established on these farms. Much wartime charcoal-cutting was done by immigrant villagized populations within former state farms and joint enterprises where troops were stationed.

The trade's wartime expansion advanced from military post to military post.<sup>(70)</sup> As areas close to the settlements were cut out, charcoal burners moved away during the day to cut, withdrawing in the evening to the relative security of the village-cum-military-post for fear of attack. Production was risky during the war, and there has been much speculation among refugees and returning locals as to why at least some of these settlements escaped more severe Renamo attacks and were able to continue producing charcoal. The following account of the trade's expansion was given by a charcoal burner from Inhambane who became Frelimo secretary of the charcoal-burning population living at the military-guarded radio post, Alto Enchisa, occupied when Changalane became deforested:<sup>(71)</sup>

People started cutting here during the war, it was previously a cattle ranch. They came first from Changalane just to cut, but when they saw it was safe, they stayed on. There were no locals. There were many problems in the settlement initially, it was a very difficult place to live. You see, there were no women here and a lot of fighting centered around the few that there were. People got here by leaving Inhambane during the war for Maputo, but then found city life too expensive so they got into the fuelwood and charcoal trade, initially going to Changalane. When the wood got finished there, they started to spread out. Now the wood is finished here too and people are pushing on down the Tembe river, particularly in Matutuine, though it can be difficult to get a place to stay there now because that place has owners.

Patterns of expansion changed after the war. As trees were cut out, charcoal burners moved away from government military strongholds within former state and private farms and advanced toward Renamo-held bush.<sup>(72)</sup> The expansion of the trade in the context of peace was facilitated by a greater degree of physical security but constrained by the return of former landowners who, regarding the trees as theirs, attempted to restrict access.

The social base of charcoal-cutting settlements also changed after the Peace Accord, though they continued to absorb labor migrants, Maputo youth, and many demobilized (often unofficially so) soldiers from both armies. By 1995, there were more women in the older, better-established settlements. Some returning locals re-joined the trade. A Renamo history or Renamo contacts might have become more important for would-be cutters after the trade expanded into Renamo's well-wooded areas.

As former refugees and wartime displaced people returned home to charcoal-cutting areas, they found a completely transformed landscape. In some places, there were scattered homesteads when locals fled, rather than villages. In their absence during the war, charcoal burners moved into nucleated settlements, formed local militias and party committees, and

elected secretaries to liaise with the administration. So returnees came back to register under foreign secretaries and, in theory, were supposed to take their disputes to be heard by people they did not know (and still less trusted).<sup>(73)</sup> In other places, charcoal burners living in settlements founded after the Peace Accord chose to have no contact with the administration.<sup>(74)</sup>

Returnees with historical claims to land resented sharing their trees with people they accused of cutting and burning even fruit trees and trees on ancestral graves. In some places returnees complained that there was scarcely enough timber with which to build a hut.<sup>(75)</sup> They elaborated the value of trees in more than simply economic terms; indigenous trees were said to "pull" the rain; certain species represented the resting place of ancestral spirits; and alcohol prepared from the marula fruit (*ucanyi*) was the focus for a series of ceremonies performed by traditional authorities to secure rain, fertility, and peace. Indiscriminate tree felling was one among many explanations given for the postwar drought.

The worst conflicts between charcoal burners and locals resulted in retaliatory hut-burning, for example, at Maziminhama, a settlement dominated by charcoal burners originally from Inhambane and located on the periphery of the JFS concession following eviction. The secretary explained:<sup>(76)</sup>

There are lots of conflicts here with locals: charcoal burners don't bother to ask if someone lives here before cutting trees. When the old residents return, their land is occupied and cut out. One woman came and found her place occupied and the charcoal burners refused to move out. So she got others to come and destroy their homes. She was detained by the police for two weeks. In the meantime, other homes were burnt in retaliation. Usually we give land back to returnees, only this group refused...then they decided to move out anyway—they've moved on to cut in a new area.

At other times, mutual suspicion between charcoal burners and locals was expressed through allegations of witchcraft.<sup>(77)</sup> Disputes were not generally ethnicized; in only one account did an old man single out Matswa from other immigrants (mainly Shangaan- and Tshopi-speaking) as the epitome of disrespect.<sup>(78)</sup>

The immigrant charcoal burners were, by their own admission as well as by the stereotype of returnees and the administration, often lawless, violent, and armed. The returning local population tended to stigmatize whole settlements and all nonlocal charcoal burners in this way. But the charcoal burners themselves tended to blame subgroups, such as demobilized soldiers and itinerant laborers or those who kept more than one home. Sometimes gang culture and disregard for local authorities was blamed—in Maziminhama, for example, where individuals "bring in the gang rather than resolving their problem themselves. The structure can't control it. In fact, certain people don't go to the structures to resolve their problems."<sup>(79)</sup> In such contexts, attempts by leaders of charcoal-burning settlements to control the location and type of trees cut generally failed. Charcoal burners in Maziminhama explained how the secretary (himself also a charcoal burner originally from Inhambane) tried to institute this type of system:

He used to allocate places for us to cut and then when you'd finished you were supposed to communicate this to him and he'd give you a new place. But now there is no control, people just go and cut saying this land doesn't belong to anyone. How can you control people who have guns?

Sometimes charcoal burners' conflicts with locals became party political. In Changalane, returning locals were labeled Renamo by charcoal burners who stayed in Changalane during the war.<sup>(80)</sup> In other places, the reverse was the case, particularly when the charcoal burners were living near former Renamo bases, such as in the environs of Matsequenha in Namaacha and Kwahle in Matutuíne.<sup>(81)</sup> In Gumbe and Nkulula, close to Matsequenha, local Frelimo secretaries tried to hold joint meetings with their new neighbors, but the charcoal burners refused to attend.<sup>(82)</sup> This merely reinforced mutual mistrust in a context where fear was heightened because regular roadside ambushes and banditry had become established after the war. In contested areas where both Frelimo and Renamo had local representatives, the opposing parties blamed each others' demobilized soldiers for the disrespectful and violent culture associated with charcoal burning after the war.

The position of district and *posto* administrators in the land disputes which were presented to them was to reassert that Mozambicans were all equal and that all citizens have the right to live where they choose. In one dispute in Porto Enrique (known as "little Inhambane" because it was dominated by immigrant charcoal burners from Inhambane), returning locals challenged the legitimacy of a charcoal-burner-turned-assistant-secretary to hold office. The assistant secretary explained the dispute in the following way:<sup>(84)</sup>

There are lots of land problems. The owners of the land said we had to go back home, but the Changalane administration gave us a letter saying we're Mozambican just like them, we're all Mozambican. I was elected as secretary, but the locals say no, it must be one of us, a local from here....

After the Peace Accord, some charcoal burners registered with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to return home. The lists of those who registered at Changalane showed clearly that the overwhelming majority came from Inhambane (90 percent), plus a few from Gaza, Zambezia, Cabo Delgado, and elsewhere. Despite the lists, however, most did not leave. They felt they could not go back home empty-handed. One charcoal burner from Zambezia explained: "How can I go home and announce, 'Here I am, here I am...with nothing.' What sort of reception would I receive?"<sup>(84)</sup>

As charcoal burners dispersed from the original wartime settlements, returnee communities tried to prevent them from settling or attempted to restrict the places or species cut.<sup>(85)</sup> The latter efforts mostly failed because leaders had no means of enforcing compliance against groups who were feared and threatened violence. However, controlling residence sometimes succeeded. For example, when charcoal burners started building furnaces on the outskirts of Manyahane, a community with a powerful local chief who had remained with Renamo during the war, the locals explained: "We told them, 'OK, look here, when those furnaces are finished, then OUT.' We gave them 14 days to leave." In another instance, a charcoal burner originally from Zambezia was refused residence after marrying a local woman in forested Kwahle on the grounds that he was not serious about *settling*, but was merely using marriage to the woman (who had a history of several husbands) as a strateg<sup>(86)</sup>y for gaining access to trees. He was told to take the woman away to settle with him. In areas where political authority was contested, attempts to control residence often failed because refusal by one local leader served as grounds for acceptance by another.<sup>(87)</sup>

Where the charcoal trade was well established during the war and before locals returned, immigrant charcoal burners had the upper hand. They sometimes used their influence with charcoal purchasers to exclude locals. Charcoal trucks sometimes bought from defined producer groups and returning locals in some places were not able to sell their sacks. The charcoal burners had their own claims to land and resources based on wartime roles of "liberating" (in Renamo zones), "protecting" (in government zones), or "resisting" (in either zone) in the absence of the actual owners.

The charcoal trade's expansion during the war stemmed from increased urban demand, which was met by new charcoal-cutting communities with military and Maputo-based links. The degree of conflict it generated in the postwar period resulted from the return of locals to charcoal cutting areas, the heightened importance of this source of income in a drought economy, and the continued recruitment and dominance of immigrants in the trade.

## 2) Hunting

Postwar hunting was concentrated in Renamo zones, though the few existing game-rich government-held areas such as the Maputo Special Reserve also attracted hunters (EDG 1994, p. 123). Like charcoal burners, the hunters supplied the Maputo market; they were drawn from demobilized soldiers and the Maputo unemployed in the context of a lack of alternative opportunities. Many hunters were Maputo based, traveling out of the city in vehicles for each hunting expedition.<sup>(88)</sup> Wartime legacies were important in the expansion of hunting—not only because hunters included many former soldiers (of both sides) who operated during the war in game-rich areas and had a close knowledge of the bush but also because firearms continued to be available. Although some hunters were independent, there also were larger, organized networks. <sup>(89)</sup>

Disputes arose with returnees partly due to competition over resources and disrespect for local trapping.<sup>(90)</sup> Hunters were also feared; in the worst areas, nighttime gunfire sprayed through returnees' huts "as if there was war."<sup>(91)</sup> In these places, fear of hunters contributed to the many reasons why people delayed returning home.

Fiscal and licensing controls on hunting were ineffective after the war. Some control points could be avoided (by using alternative routes or simply not stopping) while officials at others could be bought off or threatened. How to control armed hunters, some of whom were allegedly well connected, remained an unanswered question for local administrators and police. People sometimes welcomed the prospective advent of Lomaco and other companies on the grounds that company militias would make the roads safe, control hunters and charcoal burners, and keep bandits at bay.

## 3) Fishing

Unlike charcoal burning and hunting, fishing was a seasonal activity and some grounds were drought vulnerable.<sup>(92)</sup> After the war, however, access to the more important fishing grounds was an important source of income and dispute.

Control over some fishing grounds—like control over some trees—was important for local "traditional" authority. For example, chiefs sometimes controlled the timing and location of fishing drives known as *fonyo*.<sup>(93)</sup> Undertaken in pools

created by receding riverine flood waters and in lagoons between knee and thigh depth, this method of fishing involved the chief or *indvuna* assembling all the young men, who formed a human chain across the water and, advancing together, herded the fish into a confined space.<sup>(94)</sup> Although important in some areas before the war, this type of fishing dwindled during the independence period and diminished further after the war because of drought, lack of local authority, and intercommunity divisions.

Other types of fishing were more individualistic even before the war. Sites in fishing camps were individually owned and passed on to other family members. The fishing trade had a prewar history of incorporating immigrants recruited in Maputo or through migrants' networks; newcomers would serve as clients or employees of established fishermen or could rent out sites. Before the war, fishing camps already served Maputo and South African markets and used a network of traders as go-betweens. Trade contracted in the war, however, since many fishing grounds and the trading routes were inaccessible and dangerous.<sup>(95)</sup>

In the postwar period, fishing, like charcoal burning, incorporated many demobilized soldiers, out-of-work labor migrants, and others recruited in Maputo as well as locally. In contrast to prewar norms, many were neither enlisted by nor bound in clientage to established local fishermen but occupied sites abandoned during the war. In Renamo-controlled Chihahlo on the Maputo River, for example, fishing was largely unregulated and dominated by demobilized soldiers. A local resident explained:<sup>(96)</sup>

[Former] troops from both armies are now fishing here. It makes people afraid to fish themselves. Those are the very ones who violated and robbed. They use very fine nets and I put this to Renamo, but they need orientations [from their superiors], they never deal with anything themselves, they are just little. Another problem is that these people are citizens of Mozambique.... Today, where can I take my problems, my complaints? If it was the colonial period, illegal fishers would be out. But now they can go and sell their fish anywhere, even to the administrator or those at the fiscal points. When we see these hunters shooting crazily, we say to ourselves, if this was the colonial period.... Now women bring their husbands here, they don't introduce them [to any authority], they never ask for land, the men simply stay with the women. Now there's no authority, everyone does what he wants.

Elsewhere, local leaders tried to control access to important fishing grounds that were attractive to newcomers. They did so by trying to control residence. In one case, which was referred to the administration at Catuan, leaders had banned single fishermen from the community on the grounds of "tradition" and because they were creating confusion,<sup>(97)</sup> for bachelor fishermen had been accused of demanding sex from women fish vendors who came to buy from them. This was presented as a problem for married women, and the locally devised solution was to banish unmarried, nonlocal fishermen. The fishermen's defense was that women traders from South Africa or elsewhere in Mozambique often walked long distances to purchase fish. They would arrive in the evening, asking the fishermen for a place to stay: "So where are they to stay? We have only one-room shacks," the fishermen argued.<sup>(98)</sup>

The combination of poor rains, seasonality, and enhanced harvesting meant that some of the fishing camps dwindled after a relatively short period. Locals ceased policing settlements as young immigrant fishermen so keen to marry their daughters and build their homes near the fishing grounds went back to Maputo or South Africa.<sup>(99)</sup> Fishing made an important, though in some places temporary, contribution to postwar rural livelihoods.

#### **4) Sura (palm wine)**

Palm wine is an important component of the rural economy in the sandy soils of the coastal hinterland. Palms had owners before the war, and although disputes are less widespread than those related to the other trades detailed above, in some places severe conflicts accompanied the return of former tappers. In areas of Renamo influence close to the Natal border, such as Puza, Renamo leaders invited palm tappers into the area in 1991, shortly before the Peace Accord, to tap for them and develop the cross-border trade. Since many of these invitees were neither locals nor former palm owners or users, many disputes came to pass when returning locals tried to resume their previous tapping livelihoods.<sup>(100)</sup> Slightly further inland, no disputes occurred because the former residents had not returned and almost all tapping was done by immigrants. A palm cutter in Ndlovu described this contrast:<sup>(101)</sup>

There are no problems of disputes over palm trees here in Ndlovu, you can just cut. Most of the former residents are not here. But at Puza there are big problems: if someone has land and owns palm trees then someone else comes and taps, there'll be a dispute. All the palms there have owners. It's not like here, there are no problems because there are no locals. We're all foreigners here.

This palm cutter was himself originally from Gaza and had settled in the area before the war as a fisherman, having been contracted in Maputo by a local. During the war, he was moved by the government to the administrative post of Zitundo, where he joined the Frelimo militia before switching to join Renamo. He became a tapper only in the postwar period. His case illustrates not only the complexity of population migrations and the discontinuities between pre- and postwar patterns of resource use, but also the implications of wartime political contacts for postwar resource access.

## Conclusion

Disputes over land and resources in the postwar period took a particular form and intensity in districts close to the capital. Many local conflicts were associated with charcoal burning, hunting, fishing, and to a lesser extent palm-wine tapping as these trades came to form the backbone of rural production in much of Matutuíne and Namaacha. These trades supported not only initial returnees but also significant numbers of demobilized soldiers, wartime displaced, and unemployed labor migrants. Their importance was heightened because other rural economic activity was severely constrained by the drought and the legacies of wartime destruction. The contraction of opportunities in South Africa, combined with the lack of employment in Maputo, enhanced competition in these rural trades. For former soldiers who operated close to the capital during the war, a knowledge of areas rich in natural resources, a network of contacts for marketing, and a legitimacy derived from wartime "resistance" provided an entry into new areas for settlement and new, relatively lucrative occupations.

Disputes with locals who had historical claims to these resources were severe because much was at stake. Attempts to regulate resource use largely failed because of the crisis of authority at local level and the continued presence of arms. Attempts by both government and Renamo to extend influence in areas abandoned during the war sometimes resulted in multiple, contested, and distrusted sources of authority over resource use. The legitimacy of traditional leaders, in alliance with government or Renamo or asserting their independence from either party, was often equally contested, leaving communities divided and land use unregulated. Bitter conflict over resources between locals and outsiders fed into and reinforced a climate of fear and suspicion which pervaded much of the rural area. The stories of violence, banditry, and witchcraft built on actual incidents of violence, but their elaboration further crippled local authority and attempts to arbitrate and resolve disputes because leaders, individuals, and groups were rapidly (and sometimes arbitrarily) labeled as the enemy.

The future of these trades is unclear. Although the advent of good rains and the ongoing rehabilitation of infrastructure may do much to stabilize rural life and livelihoods, persistent high unemployment in Maputo and South Africa is likely to continue to affect patterns of resource use in districts such as Matutuíne and Namaacha, now drawn into the expanding urban hinterland.

At the same time as local struggles over access to resources are occurring, a further set of conflicting claims to the same resources are being staked at other levels. Most key resources are now within areas of solicitation for land from the private sector as well as within areas earmarked for conservation. So the proliferation of disputes at the local level within the family sector may be supplanted by competition from other sources. In the districts, decisions regarding the overlapping desk-top plans for private and conservationist development have yet to be made. In the interim, the steps already taken to reconstruct schools and health services are shaping land-use patterns in the same contested territory. Although it is not clear which of the many overlapping private interests will be accorded leases for the land, initial investments by some leaseholders threaten new controls on resource use and a new round of population displacements. What is clear is that the different groups staking their claims to resources are far from equal actors in this game.

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## Endnotes

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- 3 Reviewed in Myers (1994, pp. 603–33). See also: Myers and West (1993, p. 22); Myers, Eliseu, and Nhachungue (1994); and Alexander (1994b).
- 4 This term is used in Mozambique to refer to land users without title. For a critical discussion of this categorization, see Myers (1994, p. 607).
- 5 Interviews were conducted in the four districts of Matutuíne, Namaacha, Moamba, and Magude in August and September 1994. A second set of interviews was conducted between January and March 1995 in Matutuíne and Namaacha.
- 6 Such continuities are characteristic. See Alexander (1994a), Borges Coelho (1993), Myers (1994, p. 611).
- 7 According to the *chefe de posto* of Changalane, another several thousand hectares of grazing land may be added (interview, 26 March 1995). Documentation of the earlier period includes “Relatório de Plano” (1984).
- 8 The population was probably higher than these administrative figures suggest.
- 9 Interviews with Frelimo secretary, charcoal burners, demobilized soldiers, and returning locals, Maziminhama, 2 September 1994; interview, *chefe de posto*, Changalane, 26 March 1995. Part of the population of Mussuquelane was also threatened (interview, member of Ad Hoc Land Commission, Changalane, 5 September 1994).
- 10 “Relatório de Plano” (1984). Concession boundaries have apparently been modified as land changed hands at independence and since. Myers (1994, p. 612) also notes that boundaries have not remained constant as land was nationalized and reprivatized.
- 11 Interview, *chefe de posto*, Changalane, 26 March 1995; interview, District Director of Agriculture (DDA), Namaacha, 26 August 1994.
- 12 This population includes the *aldeia comunal* of Mayelane (population 3,040), Changalane (population 4,140), Mafavuka I and II (population 986), and part of Mishangulene (population 2,936). Population figures are from district records, 27 April 1994.
- 13 Interview, *chefe de posto*, Changalane, 26 March 1995.
- 14 Interview, locality president, Mayelane, 1 September 1994; interview, provincial governor, 6 October 1994.
- 15 Interview, *chefe de posto*, Changalane, 26 March 1995.
- 16 Although 60 percent of the district’s prewar family-sector cattle-holding population of 23,460 was concentrated in the northern part of Namaacha, the remaining 40 percent, or the 9,384 head of cattle in the posto of Changalane, was significant (“Relatório de Plano” 1984).
- 17 Before this concession was detailed in provincial records, a trial 100-hectare plot of eucalyptus had been planted within the proposed area.
- 18 There were two relatively small cattle ranches in the southern part of the concession in the colonial period, according to interviews in Puza and Ndlovu, 11 March 1995.
- 19 No environmental impact assessment (EIA) was carried out prior to the project’s authorization, though the project’s status (“category A”) required one. Following adverse publicity, Sappi agreed to an EIA undertaken in April 1995 by the Natural Resources Institute, University of Natal. See Hatton et al. (1995, p. 18).
- 20 Recent press reports of conflict include Nhancale (1996) and Koch (1996).
- 21 An EIA conducted in 1995 recommended reducing Mosaflorestal’s concession to 21,000 hectares to prevent adverse ecological effects (Koch 1996).
- 22 The concession was situated within a Renamo-administered area; probably less than half of the former population had

returned in March 1995.

23 Interviews, Zitundo, 10 March 1995.

24 See Hatton et al. (1995, pp. 14–15). Applications detailed here predate Viljoen's negotiations with Chissano in early 1995, which secured further land for South African farmers in the north of the country.

25 One private application for a game reserve on the peninsula north of the game reserve enclosed a population of 4,000 (De Vletter 1995).

26 The situation may have improved following adverse publicity in *Noticias*.

27 Interviews with: *chefe de posto*, Ressano Garcia, 13 September 1994; first Frelimo secretary, Moamba, 12 September 1994; local leaders, Chankulo and Movene, 14 September 1994.

28 For a comparison of roads and public and other transport before and after the war, see "MatutuRne Dorme no Antigamente," *Savanna*, 26 April 1995; interview, owner of mined plot, Bela Vista, 3 March 1995.

29 Cattle populations numbered 32,000 in Namaacha in 1983 and 70,000 in Matutuíne before the war ["Relatório de Plano" (1984, p. 39); and interviews, DDA, Namaacha, 26 August 1994, and veterinary officer, Matutuíne, 18 August 1994].

30 "Ladrões abandonam búfalo," *Savanna*, 26 April 1995.

31 Interviews, Mayelane, 1 September 1994; Sessenta, 27 August 1994; and Gumbe, 9 September 1994.

32 Interviews, Catuan, 21–23 March 1995; and Nkulula, 7–9 September 1994.

33 Interviews, Catuan, 21–23 March 1995; Madebula, 22 March 1995; Zitundo, 9 March 1995; Puza, 11 March 1995.

34 Interviews, Nkulula, 7–9 September 1994.

35 In Changalane, the land rush is dated explicitly as post-1958 by the *chefe de posto*, Carlos da Cruz Torres e Cerveira Baptista [AHM (1962, p. 6)].

36 On weekend farmers, see AHM (1962). 37 AHM (1969–1974). See reports on banjas (community meetings) in Nemaacha (9 July 1974) and Changalane (19 July 1974).

38 See, for example, Chigubuta, in AHM (1962).

39 Chief Cocomela, Nemaacha, in the *banja* of 9 July 1974, reported in AHM (1969–1974).

40 Chief Mafavuka, in the *banja* of 1960, reported in AHM (1960).

41 Interviews: Chihahlo, 14 March 1995; Chia, 9 March 1995; Tinonganine, 24 February 1995.

42 Interviews: Chia, 9 March 1995; Ngwenya, 17 March 1995; and Tinonganine, 24 February 1995.

43 The situation in the Maputo *colonato* contrasts with that in Limpopo (described by Hermele 1988), where the state farm sector occupied more land than the former private owners.

44 The exception is the work of the Swiss NGO, Helvetas, to secure title for peasant associations in former *colonato* lands.

45 Interviews: district administrator, Matutuíne, 19 August 1994; assistant to district administrator, 8 August 1994.

46 Interviews: Renamo administrator and political representative, Matutuíne, 24 August 1994 and 13 March 1995; interview, provincial assessor's office, Matola, 5 October 1994.

47 One of the conditions of the Peace Accord was that territory would be administered on the basis of which armed force occupied the actual administrative posts rather than the surrounding terrain. When the accord was signed, both sides had

troops passing through Matutuíne's posts of Zitundo and Tinonganine, though neither post had a permanent presence of either side. Renamo claimed to have liberated the posts; the government claimed that, after withdrawing permanently stationed troops, Renamo had failed to establish an occupying force. Interviews: Renamo administrator, Zitundo, 24 August 1994, and Renamo political representative, Tinonganine, 14 August 1994; district administrator, Bela Vista, 19 August 1994; provincial governor, 6 October 1994.

48 Interview, Renamo administrator, Zitundo, 24 August 1994. At the national level, Renamo has not taken up this issue.

49 Interviews, Renamo administrator and political representatives, Zitundo, 24 August 1994 and 10–13 March 1995; interview, provincial assessor's office, 5 October 1994.

50 Interview, Zitundo, 24 August 1994. Political representatives and teachers in Zitundo share this view; interviews, 24–25 August 1994 and 10–13 March 1995.

51 Interviews, in Zitundo, with Renamo administrator, political representatives, and teachers, 24–25 August 1994 and 10–13 March 1995.

52 C. Nhancale, *Savanna*, 29 March 1996.

53 Interview, district administrator, Matutuíne, 19 August 1994.

54 Interviews, Hindane, 1 and 6 March 1995.

55 Helvetas had a program to secure title for peasant associations in Matutuíne. A joint pilot project between the Namaacha agricultural authorities and Svedsurvey tried to register individual family-sector titles.

56 It grew as populations were recuperated during the war. It was close to a government batallion stationed to protect ongoing Italian development work, including the building of the *pequenos libombos* dam. The village survived the war, but was subject to repeated and severe attacks from Renamo; after one attack, 50 dead were registered (interview, locality president, Mafuiane, 4 October 1994).

57 Developments started in 1990/91, with physical construction works undertaken during the war; interviews, locality president, Mafuiane, 4 October 1994.

58 Interviews, locality president, Mafuiane, 4 October 1994 and 17 February 1995; interviews, Bacabaca refugee settlement, Mafuiane, 17 February 1995.

59 Interview, refugees' representative, Impaputo, 28 August 1994.

60 As discussed in Gefray (1991), Hanlon (1990), and Minter (1994).

61 EDG (1994, p. 37). It is still unclear whether or not the new Ministry of Environment under which DNFFB falls will be equally marginal.

62 This paragraph is based on Hatton et al. (1995) and De Vletter (1995). Earlier project documents include EDG (1994).

63 See, for example, Murombedzi (1991) and Thomas (1991).

64 For example, at Pochane and Hindane, Matutuíne District.

65 For an analysis of local authority in Manica Province, see Alexander (1995).

66 Many wetland sites along the Maputo River were salinated. Some other wetland sites, such as lagoon margins and hollows, had dried out.

67 Statistics follow Santos e Silva (1993, p. 82).

68 Recent journalistic accounts of this phenomenon include Koch and Chiledi (1995). On the contraction of the number of contracts for Mozambican migrants, see James (1992, pp. 36–44).

69 Interviews with charcoal burners and local leaders: Changalane, 3 September 1994; Porto Enrique, 5 September 1994; Alto Enchisa, 2 September 1994; Nkulula, 7 and 9 September 1994; Gumbe, 9 September 1994; Maziminhama, 2 September 1994; Mussuquelane, 2 September 1994; Impaputo, 28 August 1994; Sessenta, 27 August 1994; Kwahle, 6 September 1994 and 2 March 1995; Matutuíne, 1 September 1994; Pochane, 1 and 6 March 1995; Hindane, 1 March 1995; Muhau, 1 September 1994; Manyahane, 4 March 1995.

70 A full understanding of the trade's wartime dynamics would require detailed knowledge of the shifting geography of security in all relevant districts (Boane, Manhiça, Moamba, and so on). In 1986, it was estimated that 45 percent of Maputo's charcoal supply came from Boane/Matutuíne/Namaacha [see Mansur (n.d.)].

71 Interview, Alto Enchisa, 2 September 1994.

72 In Matutuíne, charcoal burners advanced from the borders of Namaacha up the Tembe River, down the Catuan road, and toward former Renamo bases in Kwahle and Manyangane/Dzabula. In Namaacha, charcoal burners moved to exploit parts of the Lubombo foothills formerly controlled by Renamo, such as in the vicinity of Gumbe and Nkulula, while also continuing in other sections of the hills.

73 Interviews, Changalane, 1 September 1994; Porto Enrique, 5 September 1994.

74 Interviews, Gumbe, 9 September 1994; Nkulula, 7 and 9 September 1994.

75 Interview, Porto Enrique, 5 September 1994.

76 Interview, secretary, Maziminhama, 2 September 1994.

77 Interview, Hindane, 1 and 6 March 1995.

78 Interview, Mafuiana, 7 March 1995.

79 Interview, secretary, Maziminhama, 2 September 1994.

80 Interviews, Changalane, 1–3 September 1994, 26 March 1995.

81 Interviews, Gumbe, 9 September 1994; Nkulula, 7 and 9 September 1994.

82 Interviews, Gumbe and Nkulula, 7 and 9 September 1994.

83 Interview, Porto Enrique, 5 September 1994.

84 Interview, Kwahle, 2 March 1995.

85 Interview, Gumbe, 9 September 1994.

86 Interview, Kwahle, 2 March 1995.

87 Interviews, Pochane and Hindane, 1 and 6 March 1995.

88 Some charcoal burners also hunted and their settlements acted as trading centers for small game: meat and charcoal were sometimes carried jointly, raided cattle and/or game stashed underneath precariously piled charcoal sacks.

89 Junior hunters interviewed before the elections, for example, claimed to be supplied with arms and uniforms by patrons at a former Matutuíne government army base (interview, hunters operating between Manhangane and Madebula, 31 August 1994).

90 Interview, local hunter, Madubula, 31 August 1994.

91 Interviews: Madubula, 31 August 1994; Ngwenya, 17 March 1995.

92 This section is based on fishing activity in the Maputo River (Chihahlo, Catuan, Chucha, and Guebeza) and in the lagoons of Zitundo.

93 Interviews, Chihahlo, 14 March 1995.

94 Described in W. Felgate (1982, p. 71).

95 Some fishing continued in Zitundo on the basis of negotiated agreements with Renamo (interviews with fishermen and Renamo administrator, Zitundo, 24 August 1994).

96 Interview, Chihahlo, 14 March 1995.

97 It is an argument more commonly used against single women.

98 Interviews, Catuan, 30 August 1994.

99 Interviews, Chucha, 21 March 1995.

100 Interviews with chiefs and tappers, Puza I and II, 11 March 1995.

101 Interview, palm cutter, Ndlovu, 11 March 1995.

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