



**REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FUND**

**Project for Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods for the
Northern Region of Mozambique
Project N° 174635**

SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT PLAN

Security Risk Assessment and Management Framework

PART 1: General

Contents

This Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and Security Management Framework (SMF) is provided in three parts:

Part 1 - General: Focusing on the methodology, security context and threat environment
Part 2 - SRA: Focusing on identifying Project security risks and mitigation measures
Part 3 - SMF: Focusing on security architecture, processes, procedures, and physical security requirements.

1	PART 1: GENERAL	3
1.1	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
1.2	INTRODUCTION AND PROJECT OVERVIEW	3
1.3	METHODOLOGY.....	5
1.4	SECURITY CONTEXT AND THREAT ENVIRONMENT	6
2	PART 2: SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT (SRA)	11
2.1	KEY SECURITY RISKS - PROVINCIAL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS	11
2.1.1	<i>Violent Extremist Armed Attack</i>	<i>11</i>
2.1.2	<i>Criminal Aggression / Armed Robbery, Extortion and SOC.....</i>	<i>12</i>
2.1.3	<i>Kidnap / Abduction.....</i>	<i>12</i>
2.1.4	<i>Civil Unrest / Protest.....</i>	<i>13</i>
2.1.5	<i>Theft and Petty Crime.....</i>	<i>13</i>
2.1.6	<i>Harassment by Military, Police and Security Forces.....</i>	<i>13</i>
2.1.7	<i>Road Traffic Accidents.....</i>	<i>14</i>
2.2	PROVINCIAL RISK MATRIX SUMMARY	15
2.3	RISK MITIGATION	16
2.4	CONCLUSION	18
3	PART 3: SECURITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (SMF).....	18
3.1	INTRODUCTION AND AIM	19
3.2	NATIONAL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND BEST PRACTISES	20
3.3	OVERVIEW OF PROJECT COMPONENTS.....	20
3.4	CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK	20
3.5	SECURITY MANAGEMENT PLANNING FRAMEWORK.....	21
3.5.1	<i>Security risk framework.....</i>	<i>21</i>
3.5.2	<i>Organisational framework</i>	<i>21</i>
3.5.3	<i>Crisis management.....</i>	<i>23</i>
3.5.4	<i>Security partner arrangements</i>	<i>24</i>
3.6	SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK.....	24
3.6.1	<i>Operational security mitigation measures</i>	<i>24</i>
3.6.2	<i>PIU security.....</i>	<i>27</i>
3.7	ADDITIONAL SECURITY RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS	28
3.8	CONCLUSION	29

Table of Figures

FIGURE 1. MOZNORTE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.....	5
FIGURE 2. MAP SHOWING DISTRICTS OF INTEREST AND VE INFLUENCE IN CABO DELGADO AS OF 1 JULY 2021.....	10
FIGURE 3. - MOZNORTE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE	23

Acronyms and Abbreviations:

ADIN	Agency for Integrated Development in the North
APAIPS	Area of Environmental Protection of the First and Second Islands
BIOFUND	Biodiversity Conservation Foundation
CF	Community Fund
CMC	Crisis Management Committee
FADM	Mozambique Armed Defence Forces
FDS	Defence and Security Forces
FNDS	National Fund for Sustainable Development
GoM	Government of Mozambique
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
MADER	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MIMAIP	Ministry of Sea, Inland Waters and Fisheries
MITA	Ministry of Land and Environment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
ProAzul	Blue Economy Development Fund
PNQ	Quirimbas National Park
PRM	Police of the Republic of Mozambique
ProAzul	Blue Economy Development Fund
QGAS	Quadro de Gestão Ambiental e Social
RDF	Rwandan Defence Forces
REN	Niassa Special Reserve
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SMF	Security Management Framework
SMP	Security Management Plan
SOC	Serious and Organised Crime
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
VE	Violent Extremists
VEO	Violent Extremist Organisation

1 PART 1: General

1.1 Executive Summary

- Significant insecurity and crime in parts of the northern provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula mean that Project interventions and activities, in several locations, are classified with high security risk.
- The security risks that are likely to impact Project implementation most are: conflict due to violent extremism (with internally displaced people's resettlement as a potential escalation factor); criminal aggression / armed robbery, extortion and serious and organized crime resulting from Project intersection / perceived interference with illicit trade and leading to violence against communities; and harassment / abuse by military, police, and security forces (FDS).
- Risk management approaches must focus mostly on security risk reduction, with some situations requiring 'risk acceptance'¹ and close monitoring. However, managing the security risk resulting from a violent extremist conflict requires 'risk avoidance'² and a specific strategy built on a nuanced and current understanding of the situation.

**It should be noted that both the SRA and SMF are living documents that must be updated regularly to reflect the evolving security situation.*

1.2 Introduction and Project Overview

The Government of Mozambique (GoM), with support from the World Bank Group, is preparing a Rural Resilience Project for Northern Mozambique (hereafter referred to as "the Project" or "MozNorte"), which aims to improve the livelihoods of vulnerable communities and improve natural resource management in selected rural areas of Northern Mozambique, with special focus on IDPs from the insurgent conflict in Cabo Delgado, as well as women and youth.

The project will be implemented by the National Fund for Sustainable Development (FNDS), the Blue Economy Development Fund (ProAzul) and the Biodiversity Conservation Foundation (BIOFUND), under the supervision of the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER), Land and Environment (MTA) and Sea, Inland Waters and Fisheries (MIMAIP), and in coordination with the Agency for the Integrated Development of the North (ADIN). The FNDS, will be responsible for coordination, and the three entities will be responsible for operational management with fiduciary and safeguard responsibilities.

The Project will be implemented in 18 districts in the three provinces of the Northern region (Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula), through multiple small sub-projects (covering small infrastructure, agriculture, fisheries, and activities to promote community management of natural resources and

¹ Risk acceptance, in this context, is a conscious strategy of acknowledging the possibility of risk in the absence of approaches that could mitigate, transfer, or avoid those risks. Risk acceptance should not be confused with the underlying security principle of 'acceptance', as described 3.6.1, which is based on gaining consent from stakeholders in an operational area, including those who might obstruct access to, or commit acts of aggression against, beneficiaries and field workers.

² Risk avoidance involves not performing any activity that may carry or induce the risks in question.

improved management in conservation areas), which will be identified, prepared, and implemented during Project implementation.

The Project is structured in four components:

Component 1 - Improving livelihoods in targeted communities (a total of 300)

Subcomponent 1.1 - Community Capacity Building

Subcomponent 1.2 - Community Demand Driven Development (CF) Community Fund

Subcomponent 1.3 - Conservation Agriculture Interventions

Subcomponent 1.4 - Sustainable Fisheries Interventions

Subcomponent 1.5 - Community Conservation Interventions

Component 2 - Improved governance and institutional strengthening for sustainable management of Natural Resources

Subcomponent 2.1 - Improved Forest Governance

Subcomponent 2.2 - Conservation Area Management

Subcomponent 2.3 - Fisheries Management

Component 3 - Project Coordination, Management and Communication

Component 4 - Emergency Contingency Response Component

Component 1 integrates small infrastructure improvement activities in the 18 covered districts and 300 target communities, through a Community Fund (CF) to be managed by the communities, after a capacity building process. The CF will also finance small business initiatives in the communities. Along with the CF, MozNorte will have support mechanisms or co-financed grants directed to small farmers (with special conditions for displaced people, women, and youth), fishing related activities and community conservation programs (Chipanje Chetu and Block 4L of the Niassa Special Reserve).

Component 2 includes activities to strengthen institutional capacity to enforce the legal framework regarding forestry and to improve the management of conservation areas (Niassa Special Reserve - REN and Area of Environmental Protection of the First and Second Islands - APAIPS) with a focus on strengthening enforcement as well as finalization of spatial planning for Quirimbas National Park - PNQ.

The institutional arrangement of the Project is shown below:




Figure 1. MozNorte Institutional Arrangements

Project management and oversight

A central Project Implementation Unit (PIU) dedicated to MozNorte will be created in the city of Pemba, Cabo Delgado Province, at the provincial office of the FNDS. Hence, FNDS will be responsible for security management on this project. The Central PIU will be headed by a Project Coordinator, and will include procurement specialist, financial management specialist, safeguards team, communication specialist, and monitoring and evaluation specialist at the FNDS level. ProAzul will have a coordinator, fisheries specialist, procurement specialist, financial management specialist, monitoring and evaluation specialist, and safeguards team (one per province.) At the provincial level, two PIU satellite offices will be established in Niassa and Nampula. These PIU offices will report to the project coordinator based in the Pemba office. They will coordinate the work with provincial services and provincial departments, as well as, at district level, with the District Service of Economic Activities (SDAE) and the District Service of Planning and Infrastructure (SDPI). At this level, activities will be implemented by PIU technicians, extension workers who will be trained by the project, and service providers. In terms of PIU accountability, provincial services and provincial departments will report to ADIN/FNDS. ProAzul at the provincial level will also act through its focal points integrated into the central PIU, while BIOFUND will act through the ANAC unit in the north, the Conservation Area (CA) Administrations and the Service providers. The local bodies at the district level will have a primary role to execute the Project activities in coordination with the PIUs.

1.3 Methodology

The main objective of this SRA/SMF is to systematically identify potential security risks for project workers, sites, assets and activities as well as for communities involved in the Project during implementation across the three northern provinces of Mozambique. In addition, the SRA defines security risk mitigation measures, while the SMF provides detailed processes, procedures and physical security requirements.

Acknowledging the complexity of the northern Mozambique threat environment, the author of this document was assigned to conduct extensive field security risk assessments from August 2020-July 2021. During the field mission, predominantly completed in Cabo Delgado province, meetings were held with key security stakeholders and context-specific experts, including the police (PRM), armed

forces (FADM), UN agencies, international and national NGOs and CSOs, national and international private sector. Issues discussed with these stakeholders included the general security situation across the Project provinces, the main security dynamics, implementation risks, potential threats to project staff and beneficiaries and operational mitigation practices. It should be noted that both the SRA and SMF are living documents that must be updated regularly to reflect the evolving security situation.

To ensure applicability and relevance, this SRA/SMF follows international best practice in security risk management and is structurally linked both to the ISO 31000 / ISO31010 methodology as well as the United Nations Security Risk Management Framework and World Bank ESS4 Community Health and Safety (Security Personnel). Based on an analysis of the northern Mozambique security context, potential threats are assessed and risks to the project and its beneficiaries will be analysed based on their likelihood and impact. Likelihood and impact are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 and combined in a risk matrix as follows.

Risk Matrix		Impact				
		Negligible	Minor	Medium	Severe	Critical
Likelihood /Probability	Highly Likely (75%+)	Low	Moderate	Substantial	High	Unacceptable
	Likely (55-74%)	Low	Moderate	Substantial	Substantial	High
	Realistic Possibility (40-54%)	Low	Low	Moderate	Substantial	Substantial
	Unlikely (25-39%)	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate
	Highly Unlikely (-24%)	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low

Indicators used to assess the regional threat landscape include both quantitative as well as qualitative data - the former in the public domain and the latter, because of field and desk research, and interviews.

1.4 Security Context and Threat Environment

An overview of security trends in northern Mozambique: violence associated with extremism, serious and organized crime, marginalization, and inter-group tensions:

As whole, northern Mozambique - the provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula - can be framed as a region experiencing the effects of north-south structural inequalities, extreme violence (specifically in parts of Cabo Delgado) and crime, while holding massive resource potential. Marginalized politically and socio-economically - facing Serious and Organized Crime (SOC), corruption, and conflict leading to significant humanitarian distress and community level exclusion - a large percentage of the population of the northern provinces have suffered, not benefitted, from their natural resources because of the actions of criminals, elites, and violent extremists. Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula are home to two large conservation areas covering several districts and other smaller ones including marine and lacustrine conservation area, forests with valuable hardwoods, gemstones and mineral-rich geological seams, various small airports and airstrips, a medium-sized port in Pemba and a deep-water port in Nacala, along with hundreds of small marinas and landing beaches (ideal for illicit trafficking) along a poorly monitored coastline.

The ineffectual management and, in many cases, deliberate exploitation of resource potential of the northern provinces (by central government and local cartels) has resulted in illicit trade, ranging from:

- Wildlife poaching/trafficking (Cabo Delgado and Niassa)
- Illegal timber export (Niassa and Nampula)
- Drug trafficking (Cabo Delgado and Nampula)
- Illegal artisanal mining (Cabo Delgado and Niassa)
- Human trafficking (Cabo Delgado and Nampula)
- Illegal fishing (Cabo Delgado and Nampula)

Serious and Organized Crime

The impact of organized crime has encouraged corruption and undermined state legitimacy, provided livelihoods and local investment where the lawful economy has not, and kept borders porous and the coastline unmonitored. It is likely that political figures and their elite criminal associates have openly benefited from both the licit and illicit extraction of natural resources, while local communities have often been punished for their involvement in informal illicit economies and denied the benefits of formal investment and economic growth. A significant element of SOC is a heroin-trafficking economy, highly developed in Cabo Delgado and Nampula, which combined with wildlife exploitation, human trafficking, illegal timber, and gemstone smuggling (facilitated by corruption and an attitude of indifference) has played a vital role in the breakdown of law and order and been a major driver of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado.

Violent Extremism

Intimately entwined and exploited by SOC, violent extremism - rooted in local grievances - has manifest itself in Northern Mozambique since Oct 2017, specifically in the coastal areas of Cabo Delgado. Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, Quissanga, Palma and Nangande districts have all been severely impacted by the insurgency with villages and towns depopulated and in ruins, hundreds of thousands of people internally displaced, and thousands of fatalities. The Mozambican military and security forces (FDS) have been unable to stem the tide of the conflict. They have relied on a heavy-handed, kinetic approach, which has led to reports of human rights abuses and increased alienation of the population from the government and its representatives in the province.³ Violent Extremists (VE) have been expertly using this alienation and sense of hopelessness to recruit young men in Cabo Delgado, and, to a lesser extent, in Nampula and Niassa. The VE, a majority of which comes from the Mwani ethnic group, have crafted a recruiting narrative anchored on marginalization, revenge, and ethno-religious grievances which has been quite successful in gaining significant numbers of volunteers. Their struggle against all representations of local and national government is mostly financed through support to illicit trafficking activities and aimed at dominating trafficking territory and routes that results in financial gain provided by higher-level cartel members based also in the northern provinces. VE attempt to present themselves as the guarantors of justice and increased opportunities for the marginalized. VE have gone to some lengths to show that their struggle is not against ordinary Mozambicans - or foreign nationals - and have instead targeted

³ Amnesty International; "What I saw is death": War crimes in Mozambique's forgotten cape, March 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/3545/2021/en/>; Also: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/report-mozambique/>; also: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/mozambique>;

Despite denials by the Government of Mozambique (related to Amnesty International's war crimes allegations), these reports are consistent with the author's research and anonymous interviews with victims of abuse conducted from Jan-Jun 21

government actors, their enablers and supporters, the Makonde (an ethnic group often perceived as unjustly profiting from Frelimo governance - the party that has ruled since 1977) and anyone that refuses to acquiesce to their dominance.⁴

Furthermore, VE have benefited from the dire socio-economic conditions of Northern Mozambique to recruit and indoctrinate young men in the province. For most young people, getting an education, starting a business, getting married, or even gaining steady employment is impossible. VE have lured these desperate young men to their movement by promising riches, offering steady wages, providing interest-free loans to start businesses or to get married. These two pillars - grievances and greed - have enabled the VE to grow and establish themselves solidly in several districts of Cabo Delgado. Their presence in Nampula and Niassa is extremely limited, with only a handful of attacks outside of Cabo Delgado, however, recruiting cells are reportedly active in these provinces. In essence, VE are challengers to the established order. Their struggle is best understood as a challenge to authorities to secure increased political and religious representation, and socio-economic benefits - although they have never clearly articulated any political intent or demand. Their activities are financed and often directed by SOC cartels, with financial gain and local dominance as the primary motivator. There are no indications they are linked in any meaningful way to the global Salafi-Jihadi nebula, regardless of alarmist and false reports by mainstream news outlets, and the recent Specially Designated Global Terrorist designation of "ISIL Mozambique" by the US State Department.

The conflict in Cabo Delgado has created a precarious situation in northern Mozambique with over 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) (as of February 2021). The majority of those have been temporarily relocated in relatively peaceful districts in Cabo Delgado or in Nampula. Relocation has not been an easy process and considerable challenges have arisen for IDPs and local communities who host them. Healthcare and sanitation infrastructures in IDP camps are reportedly dire.

Significant outbreaks of cholera and COVID-19 have been reported as a result. Food insecurity is also a major concern, with a large proportion of IDPs suffering from malnutrition. Educational facilities are also extremely limited and there is a real risk that children will be left without any education due to lack of resources. Relocation has also caused friction with local communities who often see IDPs as a security risk or a burden on already overstretched resources and infrastructure. The majority of IDPs are from the Mwani ethnic group and therefore are seen by locals as potential VE infiltrators. Stringent, and often abusive, measures to vet them in Nampula have led to violence in recent months. Clashes have routinely occurred between locals and IDPs and have only been contained by forceful action from the FDS. Finally, there have been credible reports of human trafficking and sexual abuse against female IDPs. Young girls have been forced by their families to marry prominent local men to secure subsistence. Women have also suffered rape and sexual abuse in IDP camps, with some of these assaults perpetrated by the FDS. Difficult socio-economic conditions for IDPs and low-level human rights abuses against them might alienate already marginalized communities and push them to embrace violent extremism- thus further fuelling the conflict.

Ultimately, security and conflict risk are intertwined - sometimes one and the same - because of the close inter-relations and inter-dependency between SOC and violent extremism, which also enables multiple criminal fringe activities.

Multinational military operations in Cabo Delgado, involving Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) and subsequently regional forces as part the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), have dramatically changed the security environment since initiation on/around 20 July 2021. Most significantly RDF

⁴ International Crisis Group; Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado, June 2021, and Heyen-Dube / Rands (Small Wars and Insurgencies); Evolving doctrine and modus operandi: violent extremism in Cabo Delgado

and FADM have secured the Afungi LNG development site and neighbouring Palma town; the road from Mueda to Mocimboa da Praia (MDP); and MDP town. In addition, SAMIM forces have deployed between the provincial capital of Pemba and Macomia, with units as far north as Nangade.

Although these military developments are considerable, the main threat of the violent extremist organization VEO has yet to be addressed as VEs have mostly withdrawn to concealed rural areas. Others have left for their home areas in neighbouring provinces, with some merging back into local communities. Military operations, if not part of an overarching multi-dimensional strategy, and followed by a negotiated peace, may drive the violent extremism to districts not previously affected by conflict. This includes the districts where Project implementation is planned. Furthermore, the internationalisation of the conflict may make foreign personnel and assets direct targets of VE - an escalation from collateral targets. Soft targets, such as provincial capitals may also become areas for terror tactics.

Conversely, successful military operations as part of a coherent strategy with humanitarian, development and preventing and countering violent extremism components - underpinned by negotiations - is likely to provide opportunity for IDPs to return to their home areas.

A map of the Project implementation areas is shown overleaf, along with the main areas of violent extremist influence. Whereas recent military operations have recaptured key conurbations, such as Mocimboa da Praia, VE remain influential in rural areas of the conflict-affected districts.




Figure 2. Map showing Districts of Interest and VE Influence in Cabo Delgado as of 1 July 2021

2 PART 2: Security Risk Assessment (SRA)

2.1 Key Security Risks - Provincial Level Assessments

Project implementation will take place in specific districts within the three northern provinces, as detailed in the table below. The risk levels identified - as at September 2021 - for each province reflect only the districts where Project activities will take place, not the province as a whole. Where the risk levels are inconsistent with the conditions in a specific district, then an explanation is provided along with supporting comments.

Province	Project Districts
Niassa	Lago, Chimbonila, Majune, Marrupa, Mecula, Sanga, (PIU Lichinga)
Cabo Delgado	Montepuez, Namuno, Mecufe, Metuge, (PIU Pemba)
Nampula	Memba, Erati, Mecuburi, Ribaue, Moma, Larde, Angoche, Mossuril, (PIU Nampula)

The security risk - by province and relevant district - to project personnel, assets, and beneficiaries, as a result of several different threat types, is assessed as follows:

2.1.1 Violent Extremist Armed Attack

Threat Type	Province	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
Violent Extremist Armed Attack	Niassa	Likely	Unacceptable	High
	Cabo Delgado	Likely	Unacceptable	High*
	Nampula	Likely	Unacceptable	High

Comment: While the likelihood of the spread of violent extremism resulting from ongoing military operations is a *realistic possibility* in Niassa and Nampula (and *likely* in Cabo Delgado), as VE shift their geographical focus of operations it is the resettlement of IDPs that makes the likelihood of violent extremist armed conflict *likely* across all three provinces. Increasing resentment from IDPs because of no longer living in their traditional locations, while existing communities resist their presence, is likely to trigger intra- and inter- community conflict causing splits in communities and family groups and providing opportunities for radicalization of youth and violent extremism. Historically Niassa has seen the presence of VE recruiters in 2020 and while the project-specific districts in Cabo Delgado have experienced far fewer attacks than the conflict-affected districts, VE recruiters were apprehended in Montepuez. Mecufe district is also apt for recruitment as Frelimo is widely scorned (it failed to get elected and only got 28% of the vote) and the district is strategically placed between CD and Nampula. Namuno District in Cabo Delgado has experienced limited VE presence with only one reported attack in 2019. However, in Metuge, VE attacked nine times in 2020. VE have also been sighted several times conducting reconnaissance in the district, especially around Mizeze. In Nampula (Angoche, Larde and Moma districts) reports have emerged that several young men have left for Cabo Delgado to join the violent extremists for steady wages.

*Given the potential for a geographical expansion of the violent extremist conflict to previously unaffected districts, resulting from recent military operations, the likelihood of armed attack could conceivably rise to *highly likely* in the future, which could cause the risk level in Cabo Delgado *“unacceptable”*.

2.1.2 Criminal Aggression / Armed Robbery, Extortion and SOC

Threat Type	Province	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
Criminal Aggression / Armed Robbery, Extortion and SOC	Niassa	Highly likely	Severe	High
	Cabo Delgado	Highly likely	Severe	High
	Nampula	Highly likely	Severe	High

Comment: In Niassa, illegal hunters and criminals profit significantly from the illicit trade of animal products. Illegal timber operations have also led to localised violence. Forest protection units have come under attack from illegal loggers, and local people can easily be targeted by illegal hunters to join their operations, as they have little means of making a living. Violence between rival logging gangs and population has sporadically occurred though remains relatively low-level. Also, in Niassa (Lichinga) there have been politically motivated assassinations, with the killing of known RENAMO officials (an opposition political party and former armed group). Criminality in Pemba (Cabo Delgado) is significant with narcotics, kidnapping, and robberies being the most common crimes. IDPs in Pemba can also be source of risk, with high levels of crime reported in areas where they have been relocated. Montepuez (Cabo Delgado) remains a haven for SOC because of the illegal ruby trade. In Mecufi, there is evidence that travel to Chiure is becoming increasingly dangerous with uncorroborated reports of ‘bandits’ stopping travellers asking for bribes. In Nampula town, the risk of violent crime is very high compared to rest of the province. The neighbourhoods of Namicopo, Namutequeliua and Mutauanha are worst for robberies and attacks, both in the home and on the streets. Narcotic trade is also prevalent in the city, with clashes between different factions and FDS often leading to fatalities. Women and girls displaced from Cabo Delgado have been trafficked or forced into marriage by their families to secure subsistence. Rape and sexual assaults are commonplace. Kidnapping, for extortion of mid-level and prominent businessmen, conducted by SOC groups is also prevalent (see below).

2.1.3 Kidnap / Abduction

Threat Type	Province	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
Kidnap / Abduction	Niassa	Realistic Possibility	Severe	Substantial
	Cabo Delgado	Highly Likely	Severe	High
	Nampula	Realistic Possibility	Severe	Substantial

Comment: There are several motives behind kidnappings and abductions in the three northern provinces: kidnap for extortion of members of the business community; kidnap for extortion by VE of foreign nationals (although this has been limited to only 2-3 cases in the last three years); and abductions of civilians, sometimes numbering in their hundreds and mostly women and children, by VE to use as camp workers, wives, and child soldiers. This assessment focuses on the latter of the motives identified and is based on the potential trajectory of VE operations (see Part 1: General - Security Context and Threat Environment).

2.1.4 Civil Unrest / Protest

Threat Type	Province	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
Civil Unrest / Protest	Niassa	Highly Likely	Medium	Substantial
	Cabo Delgado	Realistic Possibility	Medium	Moderate
	Nampula	Highly Likely	Medium	Substantial

Comment: In Nampula (Ribau, Mecuburi and Erati districts) there have been disputes between communities and agricultural initiatives/implementers. Also, in Angoche, Larde and Moma districts, there is an increased risk of violence and threat to life emanating from labour disputes and grievances against foreigners because of recent troubles with international mining companies. In Niassa, local communities have the propensity to create disturbances and riots, in protest of a lack of basic services, but also because of inter-religious frustrations between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. FDS responses are usually disproportionate, thus fuelling protestor disruptions. Civil unrest often results in death and injury because of rapid escalation. However, in Cabo Delgado, where the FDS presence is significantly greater in number, low-level instances of civil unrest are contained far quicker than in neighbouring provinces.

2.1.5 Theft and Petty Crime

Threat Type	Province	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
Theft and Petty Crime	Niassa	Highly Likely	Minor	Moderate
	Cabo Delgado	Highly Likely	Minor	Moderate
	Nampula	Highly Likely	Minor	Moderate

Comment: Theft and petty crime is widespread throughout all three northern provinces, and often involves corrupt military, security, or law enforcement personnel. Private security personnel have also been found responsible for facilitating low-level criminal activities. Despite the prevalence of this threat type, the impact is minor and easily mitigated.

2.1.6 Harassment by Military, Police and Security Forces⁵

Threat Type	Province	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
Harassment by Military, Police and Security Forces	Niassa	Highly Likely	Severe	High
	Cabo Delgado	Highly Likely	Severe	High
	Nampula	Highly Likely	Severe	High

Comment: Reports of FDS harassment and human rights violations are extensive in the northern provinces, despite recent efforts to change the behaviour of the military, police, and security forces to support local communities rather than prey on them. In Niassa, local communities have been at

⁵ Harassment by military, police and security forces in Mozambique is well documented. Examples of harassment and human rights / International Humanitarian Law abuses have increased during responses to the conflict, as evidenced in **1.4 Violent Extremism** and footnote 3. In addition, the US Department of State's "Mozambique 2020 Human Rights Report" cites "Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; forced disappearance by government security forces etc." providing further evidence about harassment, abuses and violations by military, police, and security forces.

the mercy of criminal illegal hunting syndicates and the government's heavy-handed response to the problem. Reportedly, the police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) has been extremely brutal in dealing with illegal hunters, with allegations of extrajudicial killings, while also intimidating local communities in the quest for information. In Cabo Delgado, particularly Metuge, reports indicate that FDS responses have largely been brutal and in clear violation of International Humanitarian Law. Widespread abuses of IDPs and local people, corruption and low-level human rights abuses are regular occurrences. FDS response in locations where there have been VE operations, or a VE recruitment presence, have been extremely heavy-handed. In some instances, in Cabo Delgado, FDS has been abusing IDPs, often raping women and extorting bribes and/or sexual favours in exchange for food and medicine. FDS has also reportedly abused local government officials, demanding bribes for protection. IDPs, especially in Bairro Paquitequete in Pemba, have been routinely abused by FDS and clashes have occurred with locals.⁶

2.1.7 Road Traffic Accidents

Threat Type	Province	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
Road Traffic Accidents	Niassa	Highly Likely	Negligible	Low
	Cabo Delgado	Highly Likely	Negligible	Low
	Nampula	Highly Likely	Negligible	Low

Comment: Road traffic accidents (RTAs) are prevalent in the northern provinces of Mozambique, and across the country. Mass casualties from RTAs involving buses and coaches are most common, with high-speed travel, poor road surfaces and inadequate maintenance of vehicles being the main causes behind the accidents. Whereas RTAs related to project implementation are highly likely, the overall risk level is still low given the negligible impact.

⁶ See Joao Feijo, The Role of Women in the Conflict in Cabo Delgado: Understanding Vicious Cycles of Violence, Rural Observer N.114, May 2021; and <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-police-mistreat-undocumented-fleeing-terror-attacks-study-195170/>

2.2 Provincial Risk Matrix Summary

Risk Matrix		<i>Niassa</i>				
		Impact				
		Negligible	Minor	Medium	Severe	Critical
PROBABILITY	Highly Likely		5	4	2,6	
	Likely	7				1
	Realistic Possibility				3	
	Unlikely					
	Highly Unlikely					
Risk Matrix		<i>Cabo Delgado</i>				
		Impact				
		Negligible	Minor	Medium	Severe	Critical
PROBABILITY	Highly Likely		5		2,3, 6	
	Likely	7				1
	Realistic Possibility			4		
	Unlikely					
	Highly Unlikely					
Risk Matrix		<i>Nampula</i>				
		Impact				
		Negligible	Minor	Medium	Severe	Critical
PROBABILITY	Highly Likely		5	4	2,6	
	Likely	7				1
	Realistic Possibility				3	
	Unlikely					
	Highly Unlikely					

Legend:

1. Violent Extremist Armed Attack; 2. Criminal Aggression, Armed Robbery, Extortion and SOC; 3. Kidnap and Abduction; 4. Civil Unrest and Protests; 5. Theft and Petty Crime; 6. Harassment by Military, Police, and Security Forces, 7. Accidents

Based on this summary, the key risks that require significant mitigation for all areas and activities relating to the Project are **Violent Extremist Armed Attack; Criminal Aggression, Armed Robbery and Extortion; and Harassment / Abuse by Military, Police and Security Forces.**

2.3 Risk Mitigation

Threat	Risk at Provincial Level			Risk Management and Mitigation Approach (Avoidance, reduction, sharing/transfer, acceptance and/or monitor)
	Niassa	Cabo Delgado	Nampula	
Violent Extremist Armed Attack	High	High	High	Avoidance / Monitor: Conduct daily reviews of the locations and activities relating to violent extremism in the context of the Project to enhance understanding of the rapidly evolving nature of the conflict. Adopt a strict out-of-bounds / no-go areas approach to locations where violent extremism is likely. Engage third-party specialists in conflict analysis to ensure, short, medium, and long-term trajectories are understood, with dialogue and conflict mediation capabilities required to enhance risk reduction in project areas. In the event risk levels in Cabo Delgado or other provinces rise to “Unacceptable” due to VE operations, project activities in the affected area are to cease, and immediate evacuation to a safe area is to be conducted for all project personnel. Return to the project site should be subject to subsequent assessment.
Criminal Aggression, Armed Robbery, Extortion and SOC	High	High	High	Acceptance: Conduct close third-party monitoring of all areas where project engagement is likely to interface with criminal aggression and SOC. Ensure government and FDS are kept appraised of all indicators of SOC. Develop a communications strategy that alerts communities of the dangers of SOC and what to do if they encounter signs of it. Reduction: Monitor criminal trends and understand the specific criminal risks in detail at each project location. Ensure close PRM / Criminal Investigation Services (SERNIC) liaison and engage private security in Nampula, Pemba and Lichinga PIUs. Private security should be subject to a <i>Code of Conduct</i> and binding agreement on the use of force. Any private security provider should be a member of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA).

Kidnap and Abduction	Substantial	High	Substantial	<p>Avoidance (in line with violent extremist attack) / Monitor: Conduct daily reviews of the locations and activities relating to violent extremism in the context of the Project to enhance understanding of the rapidly evolving nature of the conflict. Adopt a strict out-of-bounds / no-go areas approach to locations where violent extremism is likely. Engage third-party specialists in conflict analysis to ensure, short, medium, and long-term trajectories are understood, with dialogue and conflict mediation capabilities required to enhance risk reduction in project areas where kidnap and abduction is likely.</p> <p>Reduction / Transfer: Ensure that all PIU personnel are trained in extortion kidnap awareness and avoidance. Appropriate “Kidnap for Ransom” insurance should be procured for key PIU staff members to transfer risk.</p>
Civil Unrest and Protests	Substantial	Moderate	Substantial	<p>Reduce: Ensure robust liaison with PRM in all PIU locations to alert of the potential for civil unrest and protests. Maintain a calendar of key dates when large gatherings of people are likely because of historical, religious, political and cultural events, and ensure all project implementation personnel avoid target areas.</p>
Theft and Petty Crime	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	<p>Reduce: Ensure close PRM / SERNIC liaison and engage private security in Nampula, Pemba and Lichinga PIUs. Private security should be subject to a <i>Code of Conduct</i> and binding agreement on the use of force. Any private security provider should be a member of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA).</p>
Harassment / Abuse by Military, Police, and Security Forces	High	High	High	<p>Avoidance / Monitor: Implement a Human Rights monitoring and reporting system at all Project sites.</p> <p>Reduction: Provide Human Rights training under the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights VPSHR in areas where public security is more likely to interface with communities. Introduce a clear <i>Code of Conduct</i> to specify what constitutes unacceptable behaviour, as a binding agreement with the security provider, which requires that use of force is proportionate to the nature of the incident.</p>
Road Traffic Accidents	Low	Low	Low	<p>Reduction: Ensure all Project drivers are trained in driving techniques in hazardous conditions and the use of vehicle emergency equipment; all vehicles are thoroughly maintained; emergency equipment is available and serviceable. All vehicles / drivers should also be equipped communications that are operable at all project sites.</p>

2.4 Conclusion

In a different context, many of the risks identified in this SRA might call for reinforced physical security measures from public or private security organizations. However, the risk management approaches are focused on measures that seek, where possible, to avoid the engagement of Mozambican law enforcement and security forces. This is because the Mozambique PRM suffers from limited resources, lack of human capacity, and widespread corruption. Police are under-funded, under-staffed, poorly trained, and poorly equipped. Police response is often slow and unreliable, and the quality of service is inconsistent. However, when and where it is deemed necessary to engage PRM / security forces, strict codes of conduct and monitoring are required, as explained in the SMF. ***These are important factors to consider while attempting to manage security risk in Northern Mozambique. Instead, security risk management efforts should focus on strong inter-community communications, dialogue, mediation, third-party monitoring, auditing, and reporting. The oversight and implementation of the recommended risk management approaches is covered in the SMF.***

3 Part 3: Security Management Framework (SMF)

3.1 Introduction and Aim

In response to the risks identified in Part 2: *Security Risk Assessment*, along with the recommended risk management and mitigation approaches, this document provides the basic policy and framework for Project security management, including:

- Context of the *Security Management Framework*
- Security management planning framework
 - General security mitigation framework
 - Organizational / institutional framework
- Security implementation framework
- Additional security resource requirements

The framework is written with the understanding that effective security and respect for the human rights of project implementers, public/private security and communities are fully compatible. Furthermore, the framework is consistent with the laws, standards, and international best-practice, as keystone guidelines to security management, as identified in paragraph 3-2.

As identified in the SRA, many security risks flow out of inherent local social issues, such as ethnic tensions, economic marginalization, organized crime, violent extremism and potential issues between the project implementers and local communities. As such, project operations and implementation staff, liaison personnel, and community relations staff are all involved in the security process. Key stakeholders from local communities are also included in assessing security risks and in considering how to mitigate and manage those risks. ***This Security Management Framework is therefore transparent, to the extent possible and appropriate, and will be included in disclosure to, and consultation with, the local communities.***

The basic systems outlined in this framework will be maintained throughout the lifetime of the project. However, the framework will be reviewed on an annual basis and/or after ***any change in the security-related context and risk profile in which the project operates*** (for example, because of changes in the *Security Risk Assessment*). Subsequent detailed security management plans, which need to be developed following a detailed project-site reconnaissance by the *Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator*, need to reflect the evolving nature of the conflict and should be reviewed monthly. Since there are significant similarities in the project locations and associated risks related to two other World Bank funded projects in northern Mozambique, the details of this framework will need to be reconciled with the SMFs designed for the other projects, to ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency. This process should be conducted within eight weeks of the clearance of this document.

This *Security Management Framework* aims to guide the Project in protecting against and mitigating risks of a security and human rights nature that could threaten communities and implementing partners, and their ability to operate, as well as the reputation of the financing and implementing agencies and their operations.

3.2 National Laws, Regulations and Best Practices

This plan is consistent with the laws, standards, and international best-practice, as keystone guidelines to security management, including:

- Mozambique national laws underpinned by the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique. While Mozambican national laws are both credible and applicable, it should be noted that reports by international organizations (such as Amnesty International's 2016 Mozambique review) have cited concerns that arbitrary arrests and detentions continue to occur regularly in violation of national and international law. Allegations persist of excessive use of force, extrajudicial executions, and torture and ill-treatment by members of the police, military, and security forces. The government's use of criminal defamation laws, the State Security Law, and the Press Law also create strong impediments against legitimate criticism of public authorities.
- International laws (particularly International Humanitarian Law in the context of the Cabo Delgado conflict).
- IFC Performance Standard 4 (Community Health, Safety and Security); World Bank ESS4 Community Health and Safety (Security Personnel); Good Practice Note on Assessing and Managing the Risks and Impacts of the Use of Security Personnel.
- Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR).
- European Interagency Security Forum (EISF) Security Guide.
- Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) Operational Security Management in Violent Environments.

3.3 Overview of Project Components

Please see PART 1: General (section 1.2 *Introduction and Project Overview*)

3.4 Context of the Security Management Framework

Please see PART 1: General (section 1.4 *Security Context and Threat Environment*)

Significant insecurity and crime in parts of the northern provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula means that Project interventions and activities, in several locations, have a high security risk. The security risks, assessed to be high, that are likely to impact Project implementation most are:

- Conflict due to violent extremism (with IDP resettlement as a potential escalation factor).
- Criminal aggression / armed robbery, extortion and SOC often resulting from Project intersection / perceived interference with illicit trade and leading to violence against communities.
- Harassment / abuse by military, police, and security forces (FDS).

The geographic scope of this Project is significant covering three provinces spread across over 250,000 square kilometres. With over 20 project sites and vast distances between them (upwards of 800km), security coordination will be a challenge. As well as the vast geography, the nature of the

Project sites (i.e., many forestry and conservation areas) and the various public security and law enforcement organisations based around these areas, precludes the use of private security actors.

3.5 Security Management Planning Framework

This section covers the ‘what’ threats to security need to be addressed and ‘who’ is responsible for addressing them.

3.5.1 Security risk framework

The SRA provides a summary of risks at provincial / Project site-level at section 2-2. An additional summary is provided below:

Threat	Risk at Provincial Level		
	Niassa	Cabo Delgado	Nampula
Violent Extremist Armed Attack	High	High*	High
Criminal Aggression, Armed Robbery, Extortion and SOC	High	High	High
Kidnap and Abduction	Substantial	High	Substantial
Civil Unrest and Protests	Substantial	Moderate	Substantial
Theft and Petty Crime	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Harassment / Abuse by Military, Police, and Security Forces	High	High	High
Road Traffic Accidents	Low	Low	Low

*Given the potential for a geographical expansion of the violent extremist conflict to previously unaffected districts (resulting from recent military operations) the likelihood of armed attack could conceivably rise to *highly likely* in the near future, making the risk level in Cabo Delgado “**unacceptable**”. The potential for this situation to arise needs to be monitored daily.

3.5.2 Organisational framework

FNDS is responsible for implementing a three-tier system of security oversight, supervision and organisation shall be adopted for the Project, including multiple points of liaison and interface with local implementers, project recipients, related communities, and other stakeholders. To enhance the tier system there is a need for *Additional Security Resource Requirements*, which are identified at section 3-7, and an MOU with the PRM to obtain effective and compliant public security support.

- **Tier 1**

Overall security oversight will be the responsibility of the *Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator (SRM/MC)*, based in the Pemba Project Implementation Unit (PIU), and two *Deputy Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinators* (to provide an adequate level of redundancy and resilience) who will work from the Nampula and Lichinga PIUs. The division of responsibilities between the two coordinators will be specified in standard operating procedures (SOPs), but their primary role is to **implement the policies and strategy established in this document and the risk management recommendations in the SRA, and develop security management plans (subsequent to a detailed project-site reconnaissance to be conducted within eight weeks of the clearance of this document)**. The three coordinators will work with, and coalesce support from, representatives

from each of the implementing organisations to achieve the aim of this plan. They will also be responsible for the implementation of the provisions of an MOU with the PRM, or other public security organisations.

- **Tier 2**

Security Coordinators shall be assigned from each of the oversight and implementing organisations (MADER, ADIN, AQUA, ANAC, BIOFUND, FNDS, World Bank, DNDEL). They will be responsible for engaging with implementers, recipients, communities, and other stakeholders. *Security Coordinators* from the implementing organisations shall undergo a period of project risk familiarisation training, related to security policy, plans and procedures, prior to commencement of activities, which will focus on 'acceptance' and the three interlinked approaches - sensitise, monitor, respond (see section 3-6.). This training will be overseen by the *Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator* and the *Deputies*, with support from the external resource provider/s detailed in section 3-7. The familiarisation training will have a train-the-trainer component to ensure that *Security Coordinators* can familiarise nominated *Stakeholder Security Monitors*.

- **Tier 3**

Stakeholder Security Monitors from each of the Project activity areas (effectively acting as security 'wardens'), who should be representative of each of the key stakeholders in these activity areas, will provide a link to the *Security Risk Coordinators* relating to all security risk aspects in this document and the SRA. For example, this will include representatives from the various conservation areas, as well as community-level monitors. The selection of these important interlocutors will take place after the appointment of Tier 1 and 2 security personnel, and after the conduct of a thorough actor mapping exercise in each activity area, to ensure there is an appropriate level of understanding of local relationships and conflict dynamics, and thus avoiding the creation of additional risk.

To maximise the effectiveness of this structure, cross-functional coordination at Tiers 1 and 2 is vital. Mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination with other key staff members within the PIUs and implementing organizations (such as community relations staff, human resources, logistics and finance personnel) is an important element of project security. SOPs should identify these specific points of coordination and the mechanisms for interaction (for example: routine meetings, formal briefings and Q&A, participation in risk assessments and report sharing).




Figure 3. - MozNorte Security Architecture

3.5.3 Crisis management

While the security personnel identified in the architecture above are responsible for the day-to-day management of Project security risk and will be required to respond to routine security-related incidents, a high-level Crisis Management Committee (CMC) is required to address significant security emergencies and/or disasters related to the Project. For the purposes of this SMF an incident is a situation that might cause (or lead to) a disruption, loss (human, asset or financial), emergency or crisis. A crisis is a situation with a high level of uncertainty that disrupts the core activities of the Project and the credibility of its implementing organisations and requires urgent action. Incident management entails taking quick, and relatively small actions, using existing resources to bring a situation back to normality. Crisis Management requires urgent and strategic action from key personnel of authority, often using resources not readily available to the Project security personnel.

A Crisis Management Committee (CMC) shall meet, as required, in the provincial PIU where the crisis is unfolding. If, however, the crisis has extended to more than one of the northern provinces, the CMC shall sit in the Pemba PIU. The following appointments will be requested to be members of the CMC, with the names to be added by the respective *Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator / Deputies* once the key personnel have been identified and notified.

Appointment	Name
State Governor's representative	
Provincial Secretary of State representative	
Head of the PRM (or representative)	
FADM representative	
Project Coordinator (and CMT coordinator)	
Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator / Deputies	
Financial Specialist	
Communications Specialist	
(Business community, religious leaders and civil society, as required)	

The CMC shall conduct a training and familiarisation period in preparation for this task, which will conclude with a table-top exercise (see section 3-7). Subsequent training and exercises will be completed twice yearly to ensure the CMC is prepared for its duties.

3.5.4 Security partner arrangements

The Project will be required to undertake a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the PRM in the three northern provinces to support the implementation of security risk management and mitigation procedures at the Project sites. The MOU shall also include the physical protection of three PIUs in accordance with the recommendations of the site security assessments (yet to be conducted). The provisions of the MOU should be agreed between the Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator and the Head of the PRM.

However, given that some members of the PRM are prone to harassing and abusing communities, the use of public security personnel for this Project should be under the strict guidance of VPSHR and follow a Code of Conduct (to be developed as part of subsequent security risk management plans), which is underpinned by:

- Guided by the principles of proportionality and good international practice in relation to hiring, rules of conduct, training, equipping, and monitoring of such workers, and by applicable law (Including practice consistent with the United Nation's (UN) Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials).
- Ensuring that those providing security are not implicated in past abuses; are adequately trained in the use of force (and where applicable, firearms), and conduct themselves appropriately when interacting with communities; and require them to act within the applicable laws.
- The Project will not sanction any use of force except when used for preventive and defensive purposes in proportion to the nature and extent of the threat.
- The Project will provide a grievance mechanism for communities to express concerns about the security arrangements and acts of security personnel.
- The Project will assess and document risks arising from the use of government security personnel deployed to provide security services.
- The Project will consider and, where appropriate, investigate all allegations of unlawful or abusive acts of security personnel, take action (or urge appropriate parties to take action) to prevent recurrence, and report unlawful and abusive acts to public authorities.

The *Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator, the deputy and PIUs are responsible* for ensuring these guidelines are included in the MOU and correctly implemented.

3.6 Security Implementation Framework

This section covers the 'how' the security threats will be managed and mitigated.

3.6.1 Operational security mitigation measures

'Acceptance' is the underpinning security strategy to be adopted by the Project (noting that acceptance in this context is a strategic principle and different from 'Risk acceptance' which is defined in the SRA). Therefore, if it is assessed that insufficient project 'acceptance' is gained from the key

stakeholders, both the lender and borrower should reassess the viability of the Project. 'Acceptance' relies primarily on gaining consent from stakeholders in an operational area, including those who might obstruct access to, or commit acts of aggression against, beneficiaries and field workers. This approach embraces the importance of analysing context and conflict dynamics, cultivating relationships with multiple stakeholders, and understanding the perceptions of local populations. Acceptance is one of three strategies, which are not mutually exclusive, and can be used in concert. The other two strategies are outlined below, but unlikely to be used prominently in the current context, only at the PIU sites:

- A *protection* approach uses protective devices and procedures to reduce vulnerability to threats to security. But protection does not affect the threat itself.
- A *deterrence* approach aims to deter a threat with a counter-threat. It ranges from legal, economic, or political sanctions (not necessarily by aid agencies) to the threat, and/or the use of force.

The key components of acceptance include active outreach to a wide range of stakeholders; considerable investment of time by staff members with excellent social, political, interpersonal and communication skills; and the development and maintenance of core messages regarding the project's mandate, objectives, and programs. Key stakeholders in an acceptance approach are anyone who formally or informally can exercise some meaningful influence on whether the Project can operate securely in its chosen environments. This may include state and non-state armed actors, government officials, local authorities, community leaders, local and international media and business or private sector individuals. Some actors may be hard to identify (sometimes because they do not want to be identified), or they may be hard to reach. Knowing these stakeholders requires mapping and analysing these actors, an exercise which implementing organizations should conduct together.

Acceptance needs to be gained from all relevant parties, including those that – for economic, cultural, religious, military, or political reasons – may distrust the Project and its implementers and feel threatened by it or harbour active hostility towards it. These situations should be identified in subsequent updates of the Security Risk Assessment. It is important to assess the influence that each party has. In some situations, having the acceptance of key influencers might be sufficient if it is impossible to secure the acceptance of all. In this context, dedicated national 'liaison' staff may be needed.⁷ In some cases, using a respected intermediary (such as a religious leader or community head) can provide the organization with local respectability.

However, an active acceptance strategy may not be limited to local actors. Improvements in communications have increased inter-connectivity meaning that key stakeholders may be geographically dispersed, but still contactable. Reaching them requires organizational willingness, competence, and adequate resources.

Within the context of acceptance - and to ensure the strategy is sufficiently embraced - this Project will adopt three interlinked approaches to support the risk management recommendations (identified in the SRA), with robust third-party assessment / audit to ensure the approaches are properly applied by project implementers.

⁷ If such staff are utilized, a task-based risk assessment should be carried out prior to their deployment.

- **Sensitize:** Ensuring that Project aims, objectives and activities are explained and discussed with all stakeholders; sensitizing and, where necessary, educating stakeholders on issues relating to the actions required (and implications) of interference / disruption caused by organized crime, corruption, and extremism/radicalization.
- **Monitor:** Ensuring that multi-channel monitoring and reporting mechanisms are in place - at all levels and where there are interfaces with second and third parties - and that reporting systems are sensitive to conflict and relationship dynamics.
- **Respond:** Ensuring that clear thresholds are established (specified in Standard Operating Procedures [SOPs]) that identify when reporting needs to be escalated, and when responses and/or additional resources are required to manage or mitigate increasing risk.

A more detailed assessment of the approaches required in order manage and mitigate risk are shown in the table below, which was extracted from the SRA.

Threat	Risk Management and Mitigation Approach (Avoidance, reduction, sharing/transfer, acceptance and/or monitor)
Violent Extremist Armed Attack	Avoidance / Monitor: Conduct daily reviews of the locations and activities relating to violent extremism in the context of the Project to enhance understanding of the rapidly evolving nature of the conflict. Adopt a strict out-of-bounds / no-go areas approach to locations where violent extremism is likely. Engage third-party specialists in conflict analysis to ensure, short, medium, and long-term trajectories are understood, with dialogue and conflict mediation capabilities required to enhance risk reduction in project areas.
Criminal Aggression, Armed Robbery, Extortion and SOC	Acceptance: Conduct close third-party monitoring of all areas where project engagement is likely to interface with criminal aggression and SOC. Ensure government and FDS are kept apprised of all indicators of SOC. Develop a communications strategy that alerts communities of the dangers of SOC and what to do if they encounter signs of it. Reduction: Monitor criminal trends and understand the specific criminal risks in detail at each project location. Ensure close PRM / SERNIC liaison and engage private security in Nampula, Pemba and Lichinga PIUs. Private security should be subject to a <i>Code of Conduct</i> and binding agreement on the use of force. Any private security provider should be a member of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA).
Kidnap and Abduction	Avoidance (in line with violent extremist attack) / Monitor: Conduct daily reviews of the locations and activities relating to violent extremism in the context of the Project to enhance understanding of the rapidly evolving nature of the conflict. Adopt a strict out-of-bounds / no-go areas approach to locations where violent extremism is likely. Engage third-party specialists in conflict analysis to ensure, short, medium, and long-term trajectories are understood, with dialogue and conflict mediation capabilities required to enhance risk reduction in project areas where kidnap and abduction is likely. Reduction / Transfer: Ensure that all PIU personnel are trained in extortion kidnap awareness and avoidance. Appropriate “Kidnap for Ransom” insurance should be procured for key PIU staff members to transfer risk.
Civil Unrest and Protests	Reduce: Ensure robust liaison with PRM in all PIU locations to alert of the potential for civil unrest and protests. Maintain a calendar of key dates when large gatherings of people are likely because of historical, religious, political, and cultural events, and ensure all project implementation personnel avoid target areas.

Threat	Risk Management and Mitigation Approach (Avoidance, reduction, sharing/transfer, acceptance and/or monitor)
Theft and Petty Crime	Reduce: Ensure close PRM / SERNIC liaison and engage private security in Nampula, Pemba and Lichinga PIUs. Private security should be subject to a <i>Code of Conduct</i> and binding agreement on the use of force. Any private security provider should be a member of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA).
Harassment / Abuse by Military, Police, and Security Forces	Avoidance / Monitor: Implement a Human Rights monitoring and reporting system at all Project sites. Reduction: Provide Human Rights training under the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights VPSHR in areas where public security is more likely to interface with communities. Introduce a clear <i>Code of Conduct</i> to specify what constitutes unacceptable behaviour, as a binding agreement with the security provider, which requires that use of force is proportionate to the nature of the incident.
Road Traffic Accidents	Reduction: Ensure all Project drivers are trained in driving techniques in hazardous conditions and the use of vehicle emergency equipment; all vehicles are thoroughly maintained; emergency equipment is available and serviceable. All vehicles / drivers should also be equipped communications that are operable at all project sites.

3.6.2 PIU security

Notwithstanding the focus on an ‘acceptance’ strategy for Project implementation, there is still a requirement to adopt a ‘protection’ and ‘deterrence’ approach to the security of the three PIUs. This includes arranging security barriers, such as fences, gates, locks, guard posts, surveillance/electronic security systems, and assigning police / security officers to specific posts. The details need to be confirmed through a site security assessment once the location of the three sites is confirmed. The numbers of police officers required to guard the PIUs, and the support they need, should be included in the Project / PRM MOU.

As a minimum, PIU buildings should be compliant with international building, safety and fire regulations, or the applicable laws of Mozambique, as appropriate to local conditions, and have:

- Appropriate access control measures based on the size and location of the premises.
- Separate entrances for personnel and visitors.
- Secured parking for authorized vehicles where appropriate.
- Alternate/emergency exits from buildings and from compounds.
- Security and/or guard force (PRM) trained on appropriate surveillance and reconnaissance detection and reporting protocols.

In addition, premises should have an emergency power supply for charging and operation of communications / IT equipment, office external security lighting and other essential equipment. Adequate reserve stocks of fuel to be maintained for on-site generators.

PIUs are also required to be equipped with the following:

Telecommunications

- An emergency communications system, established between all PIUs and sites where there is ongoing Project implementation, which should be tested and practiced at regular intervals. The system should include mobile and static satellite telephones, with the network capable of operating 24/7 should the need arise.

Medical

- Provincial level casualty evacuation plans should be developed by each PIU, which include the rescue, immediate medical attention, use of an appropriate means of transportation for evacuation, and location of primary health care facilities. This should include registering with locally available medical facilities, emergency response services, and contact numbers should be kept updated and available to all PIU personnel. The Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator and deputies shall also be trained in first aid, with a Basic First Aid pack available at each PIU.

PIU Vehicles

- First aid kit.
- Fire extinguisher
- Spare wheel, jack and appropriate tools.
- Reflector triangles, battery-powered lantern and seat belts.
- 5 metre rope, strong enough to pull another vehicle.
- Shovel, hand-axe or machete.
- Fire-lighting materials.
- High visibility sheet/flag.
- GPS-based tracking system.
- Adequate drinking water, food and necessities to support all travelling occupants for 24 hours.

In the event of a specific threat of terrorism (or the potential for direct or indirect attacks by violent extremists) arising in Pemba, Nampula or Lichinga towns - and the risk assessment remaining acceptable - then PIU premises should consider the following under advisement of the *Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator*:

- Stand-off distance (from road/entrance to building) as estimated/advised by a qualified expert (taking scale of likely threat, surroundings/approaches, construction, etc. into account)
- Structural reinforcement and blast walls as required/advised by a qualified expert.
- Shatter resistant film on windows and frame catchers.
- Bunkers/reinforced rooms.
- Surveillance and access control systems.
- Emergency food, water, medical, sanitary and shelter supplies (in non- perishable form), stocked in preparation for use in concentration points, bunkers, and/or safe rooms.
- All personnel should also prepare individual emergency bags, maximum weight 15 kg, containing essential documents, clothing, hygiene, and medical supplies, ready for rapid evacuation or relocation.

3.7 Additional Security Resource Requirements

Effective implementation of the security risk management plan will require support from external resources. These external resources aim to increase the capabilities and capacity of the *Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator* and deputies, as well as the PIUs. A budget is to be allocated to procure these resources, which will be managed by the *Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator*.

The following resources are required (ideally sourced from one third-party entity):

- External information/analytical reports (to provide continuous updates on the wider context of politics, security, violent extremism and SOC; sourced from a credible private security organization with a nuanced understanding of Northern Mozambique, or a commercial intelligence provider).
- Third-party security auditing services (engaged annually, or after major security-related incident, to provide an independent and impartial analysis of events, identify lessons learned and any changes to security posture and procedures).
- Facilitation of crisis management training and exercising.
- Dialogue and Mediation Facilitators (on a call-out basis, to manage, mitigate and resolve disputes and conflict arising from project activities, particularly as an alternative to a public security intervention).
- Access to social media monitoring (subscriber-based technical system to monitor adverse social media against the project, and its origination, and as an indicator and warning system of potential disputes and conflict) *
- Commercially available satellite imagery (to conduct comparative analysis of project areas to note general environmental changes that could affect security risk) *

* The *Security Risk Monitoring and Mitigation Coordinator* and deputy will require training in the use of these resources.

3.8 Conclusion

The SRA process for the Project is dynamic, requiring constant review and updates, especially given the evolving conflict in Cabo Delgado and potential for wider geographic impact in the neighbouring provinces of Niassa and Nampula. In response to a potentially rapidly changing set of risks, the SMP will also require regular modification and refinement in accordance with the SRA. While 'acceptance' is the key strategic approach to Project security, 'protection' and, to a lesser degree, 'deterrence' approaches are required to secure the PIUs. There is also a requirement for close coordination with, and support from, the PRM at the PIUs and Project sites, while ensuring public security compliance with local and international law. This will require a robust MOU between the Project implementers and PRM, covering a multitude of jurisdictions.